Reports showing fuel shortages in Crimea and rationing measures implemented in some regions are reminiscent of excitable reporting from last year that Russia was suffering a critical fuel shortage. The actual picture is less catastrophic, but requires the Kremlin to consider acting to prevent a bigger problem.
Vladislav Inozemtsev on how Russia’s partnership with China has turned Moscow into a technologically dependent junior partner of Beijing.
As heavy losses mount in the war against Ukraine, Russia is now offering debt relief to attract new recruits. It is the latest in a growing list of methods the Kremlin is using to replenish its forces.
Russia’s economy has so far avoided collapse thanks to high oil prices driven by the conflict in the Middle East. But there is little reason for optimism: the real sector is shrinking, and the war machine is increasingly feeling the impact of the conflict at home. In an interview with Republic, economist Vladislav Inozemtsev explains why the Kremlin fears a weaker ruble, how the “wage race” came to an end, and why Russia may hit the limits of its economic capacity by 2027.
Police in Karlovy Vary detained Metropolitan Hilarion (Grigory Alfeyev) after discovering several containers with a white substance in his car. The former head of the Russian Orthodox Church’s external relations department, who was reassigned from Hungary to Czechia, denies any involvement and rejects the allegations.
The war is increasingly reaching Russia itself. Putin’s system is under intense military and economic pressure — the only question is how long it can endure.
Moscow is benefiting from increased demand for energy amid the conflict in the Middle East, but forecasts for Russia’s economic growth over the coming years are steadily worsening.
Russia is benefiting from higher oil export revenues linked to the conflict involving Iran, but its economy is showing increasing signs of fragility. Slowing growth, sanctions pressure, and heavy dependence on energy exports are putting Russia’s economic model under strain despite the Kremlin’s efforts to sustain wartime spending.
The U.S. Treasury Department has issued a new 30-day license allowing seaborne shipments of Russian oil. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the decision is aimed at stabilizing global energy markets, supporting countries most vulnerable to energy shortages, and limiting China’s ability to stockpile discounted Russian crude.
Public pressure on the Kremlin remains far from critical, and rumors of internal fractures within Russia’s ruling elite should be treated with caution.
I was studying the budgets of medieval European cities in search of a connection between political systems and their economic foundations. I failed to find any well-grounded causal relationships; however, while examining the material, I noticed several intriguing parallels between medieval realities and the present day, which I would like to share.
Despite soaring oil prices, Russia’s economy has been contracting since the beginning of 2026. In an op-ed for Le Monde, economist Vladislav Inozemtsev argues that the downturn is driven by the Kremlin’s “neo-Soviet” policies — steep tax hikes, high interest rates, and renewed nationalizations.
Growing domestic problems and tensions between security services and political officials are being compounded by disappointment with Donald Trump over his failure to lift sanctions against Russia.
Russian imperialism is rooted less in national identity than in the belief that the “near abroad” still belongs to historic Russia. According to exiled researcher Vladislav Inozemtsev, this worldview is shared by much of the population.
In the first quarter, Russians transferred 162.9 billion rubles more into domestic banks than they sent to accounts abroad. According to preliminary data from the Central Bank, this already exceeds the total amount repatriated over the entire previous year.
Moscow’s May 9, 2026 parade is unlikely to be remembered as a show of strength. Instead, it stood out for its brevity, the presence of North Korean soldiers, and the near absence of military hardware.
By April, Russia’s budget deficit had already exceeded the annual target by 50%. Even rising oil prices amid the Middle East conflict have failed to significantly boost the country’s oil and gas revenues. In an interview with Vot Tak, economist Vladislav Inozemtsev explains why the Kremlin may benefit from a 100-ruble exchange rate to the dollar, why internet shutdowns pose a greater threat to the authorities than inflation, and why Russia remains a poor country.
The ogre-like Vladimir Putin is consuming human capital that cannot be replenished.
The mood within Russian society appears to be irreversibly broken. A guest commentary by Vladislav Inozemtsev.
The line between war and peace is often extremely narrow. The ability to shift in one direction or the other depends not only on choice, but also on timing and immediate circumstances.
Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev coined the term “deathonomics” to describe a new phenomenon: the conversion of economically marginal human lives into financial assets.
No totalitarian state has a perfectly unified and cohesive elite. Encouraging internal divisions within such systems is a strategy for weakening—and ultimately toppling—them.
The experiences of Venezuela and Russia confirm the need to split the internal power bloc in order to force real change in Iran
Russia is benefiting less from high oil and gas prices than many assume, says former Kremlin adviser Vladislav Inozemcev. He points to rising public discontent — and an increasing readiness for regime change
Europe does not have to end up as a loser in the new global order, the author argues
He previously served as an adviser to the Kremlin and later helped write the campaign program of an opposition presidential candidate. In an interview, Vladislav Inozemtsev explains why multibillion oil revenues bring limited benefit to Russia, what new trend is emerging in its economy — and which division within the Russian elite the West could exploit
The ongoing war with Iran has become an unexpected lifeline to Vladimir Putin’s Russia which appeared to be its biggest winner as the price for its oil surged over $100 a barrel, and some of the restrictions for its sales were lifted. The Kremlin, as many insiders suggest, has already lost interest in peace talks with Ukraine and become more or less involved in fighting on Tehran’s side. Under such conditions, some experts have once again called for tightening sanctions against Russia, arguing that this would lead to “peace through strength”
Alongside the battlefield clash between Russian and Ukrainian forces, a parallel struggle is unfolding over casualty figures and the real extent of losses on both sides. This has become especially pronounced as the conflict has evolved into a drone war, reshaping the balance between the wounded and the dead.
This Russian economist coined the now widely used term “death economy” when authorities began paying recruits and their families sums exceeding what an average Russian could expect to earn in a lifetime. Since then, conditions have changed: inflation has eroded the appeal of payments, and the likelihood of being killed at the front has become a probable outcome. Will Vladimir Putin significantly raise payouts at the expense of an already strained economy? According to the author, the “death economy” works like a drug: it first helps escape reality, then gradually blurs the line between what is desirable and what is real. The risk of withdrawal should not be ignored
After the turning point, non-Western states adopted Western achievements, but only in part. This gave them advantages. Now that system is returning to the West like a boomerang. The US is the first to respond in its own way. But the biggest challenge for the West is still ahead
Amid the Middle East conflict, the federal budget benefits from the surge in oil prices. However, the real economy remains stalled. And the Kremlin is turning to businesses to fund the war effort
Vladislav Inozemcev explains how the Iran war revealed weaknesses in the sanctions approach toward Russia
Russia’s economic upswing driven by the Iran war funds military spending, while higher VAT and digital isolation are causing multibillion losses
The US easing of sanctions on Russian oil and the rise in Brent prices support Moscow’s finances. However, anxiety is growing in the Kremlin over the unpredictability of Donald Trump. Economist Vladislav Inozemcev warns that the benefits may be temporary, and Russia is preparing to rely increasingly on military power and Asian alliances.
Russia and Iran have a reciprocal relationship, established during the Ukraine conflict when Putin relied heavily on Tehran’s Shahed drones
Surging oil prices after the Middle East escalation support Russia’s finances. The US is now temporarily allowing purchases of Russian oil.
Russian economist Vladislav Inozemcev, writing for the opposition outlet Ridl.io, warns that the system that allowed the Kremlin to wage war in Ukraine without mass mobilization is nearing its limits. This mechanism, which Inozemcev calls “deathonomics” (an economy where death is the most profitable investment), has served as a safety valve for the regime since 2022. It is now showing serious cracks.
Despite the sweeping sanctions imposed by the West, Russia’s economy has not collapsed. Experts highlight the sources of its resilience and point to shortcomings in the sanctions approach itself.
The invasion of Ukraine could become the first conflict in centuries to end without any consequences imposed on the aggressor state.
Despite more than 27,000 Western sanctions, Russia’s economy has not been brought to its knees over four years. In an interview with Die Presse, economists explain what has sustained this resilience — and how the Kremlin is now beginning to undermine it itself.
Four years on and after hundreds of thousands of deaths, Russia continues its offensive in Ukraine but struggles to recruit new soldiers, despite the emergence of a full-fledged “death-driven war economy.”
Four years into the war in Ukraine, Putin has yet to accomplish any of his objectives — even with an unpredictable US president who at times takes a stance closer to Moscow.
Ukraine is facing major demographic challenges and a shortage of labor: around six million people have left for Europe, some for other countries, while many have been mobilized.
In Russia, the war is no longer limited to mobilizing industry and public finances — it is transforming society itself. According to Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev, author of a report published by Ifri, the Kremlin has built a unique system in which soldiers’ deaths serve as a significant mechanism of redistribution.
The globalization of the 1990s seemed like an unbroken triumph. Trade among all was supposed to bring peace and prosperity worldwide. Yet disillusionment has set in, as not only the good but also the bad have learned to exploit globalization.
Economists refer to Putin’s wartime economy as “deathonomics.” It has boosted the economy, but now Russia is rapidly sliding into crisis.
The report attempts to outline and examine a truly new phenomenon in Russian society, dubbed “deathonomics”—the making of a mercenary army against the backdrop of the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine, eventually replacing both the Soviet (conscript) and early new Russian (contract) armies. It notes that, by the end of 2023, this trend had turned the military service into one of the highest-paying professions in the country, something not seen in Russia on such a scale since the late 17th century.
A wartime boom in Russia has given way to sluggish growth, tax hikes and squeezed public services. Will it affect the conflict in Ukraine?
Vladimir Putin is channeling all the “undesirables” into the army, the economist explains in a note for Ifri, first obtained by L’Express. A “death economy” has become the main driver of growth.
The Kremlin made Yuri Gagarin the first man in space but now lags Luxembourg in AI — which the president seems to regard as a challenge to his authority
People generally have little trust in official statistics, and most Russians believe that Rosstat deliberately understates inflation. When asked not about their trust in statistics but about how they personally perceive rising prices (“observed inflation”), respondents consistently report figures far higher than the official rate.
Russia’s economy is far less dependent on Western actions than we tend to admit. At least, this is the view of Vladislav Inozemtsev, a renowned Russian economist now living in the United States, with whom we discussed in an interview what kind of year lies ahead for Russian households and what will affect the country’s economy the most.
Russia is sending members of its indigenous communities to die in the war. In poorer regions such as Buryatia, 27 times more soldiers are killed than in Moscow. The “blood money” fuels economic growth in the region, but does not ease grief and suffering.
Trump’s South American venture could fundamentally change Putin’s situation. A guest commentary by Vladislav Inozemtsev.
Faced with sluggish growth and military spending linked to the conflict with Ukraine, President Putin has chosen to raise taxes in order not to worsen Russia’s budget situation—provoking anger among small and medium-sized businesses and households.
In the fourth year of the war, the Russian economy is stagnating. Economist Vladislav Inozemtsev explains what lies ahead in 2026.
Negotiators around Trump say they are working on peace in Ukraine 24/7, but approach the conflict as if it were a real estate deal.
Moscow is selling its most important export commodity at knockdown prices, says Russian economist Dmitry Nekrasov — and, when asked about the consequences, cites a popular Russian joke about vodka.
While some in Russia believe Ukraine is standing in the way of peace, other analysts say Russia’s President Putin has maximalist ambitions.
The way events unfold in Russia today bears little resemblance to the way those same events are portrayed in the media.
When even the dictator no longer masks the crisis, the situation is bad. Russia’s economy is showing slowing growth and “certain imbalances,” Vladimir Putin said during a plenary session of the “Russia Calling!” forum. The results were significantly below the Kremlin’s forecasts. Moreover, even Russian economists believe the country may not avoid at least several years of stagnation.
“If the authorities want the economy to continue functioning normally, they must end the so-called ‘special military operation,’” emphasizes expert Oleg Buklemishev.
In Russia, experts are already assessing what impact peace could have on the country’s economy, the ruble, and the stock market. A shock scenario is even being considered. The biggest beneficiaries would not be those most people expect. For investors in Europe, in any case, a new situation would emerge.
While the Americans are pulling out all the stops to end the war in Ukraine, the Russian president remains calm. At the same time, the Russian economy is struggling, and pressure on the population is increasing.
The State Duma has approved Russia’s 2026 budget. For the first time since the start of the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin is cutting military spending.
Vladislav Inozemtsev is one of the most renowned Russian economists. He analyzes how the Kremlin is navigating the current economic crisis — and where Putin may be reaching his limits.
Kremlin critic Dmitry Nekrasov warns in an interview that sanctions tend to stabilize Putin’s system rather than weaken it — and calls for a change of course.
For years, the regime treated public sentiment among Russians as a framework for its actions. We are gradually approaching a moment when this idyllic picture may be significantly revised.
The new US sanctions are unlikely to cause significant damage to Russia, says economist Dmitry Nekrasov. The West underestimates how resilient the Russian economy still is.
Russia is facing a new wave of sanctions from the United States and the European Union, but experts tend to believe that this is not enough to curb its ability to finance the war in Ukraine.
The Russian economy is balancing on the edge of recession, yet the war could go on for years. Its financing appears to have no immediate major obstacles, according to experts.
From Moscow, Alexey Maslov—an academic and Kremlin adviser—warns that the offensive against Russia’s oil sector and the prospect of long-range missiles for Ukraine are pushing Moscow toward disproportionate countermeasures in Europe. The nuclear specter returns. “This is not like the red lines of the past; there will be a response, and it will be harsh,” agrees Putin opponent Vladislav Inozemtsev. “Before supplying such weapons, the West must have a shared long-term strategy.”
Ten refineries stand out for having been struck twice or more since the beginning of August 2025.
Vladimir Putin’s war economy is creaking but still moving forward. The “tsar” believes he can hold out longer than Western-backed Ukraine.
Putin is planning a gradual mobilization through changes to the recruitment system. A guest commentary by Vladislav Inozemtsev.
With a new law, President Putin could expand his army. There is no draft lottery in Russia.
Talk of the Kremlin interfering in political processes in the US and Europe is so fashionable and commonplace that it’s difficult to assess the seriousness of Moscow’s actions and how to counter them. I admit, this hysteria irritates me.
With Russian forces gaining slowly on the battlefield, Ukraine hopes its long-range drone campaign will help persuade Vladimir V. Putin to change course.
Since August, Ukrainian drones have launched large-scale attacks on over 20 Russian refineries. By the end of September, 38% of Russia’s primary refining capacity had been shut down for repairs—a historic record—leading to a sharp decline in oil and gas revenues. U.S. intelligence agencies provided satellite data to help Ukraine pinpoint target coordinates, identify air defense vulnerabilities, and map drone flight paths—aiming to weaken Russia’s economy and pressure Putin into negotiations. The attacks forced Russia to halt gasoline exports, shifting imports to Belarus and China. Gas shortages hit 57 regions, fuel prices surged 40%, and the energy crisis impacted daily life.
For the first time since the start of the war, Moscow has reduced its defense budget. But what is striking is that spending on “national security” is increasing at the same time. Experts see the cuts as structural changes in Russia’s weapons and personnel requirements.
Some speak of de-escalation in the war, while others consider it to be merely a redistribution.
Europe . If the Ukrainians continue to strike oil sites at this rate, Russians will increasingly see the effects of the war in their daily lives.
Both Western and Russian-language media have intensified discussions of the prospects for a Russian-Ukrainian war – and in this context, the notion that Ukraine is now standing guard over Western civilization, defending it from Eastern barbarism, has been slipped in again and again. While I am fully on the side of the heroic Ukrainian people and wish them victory over the Russian aggressor, I would nevertheless call for a very cautious use of such categories.
Ukraine’s economic response has paid off: Moscow is feeling the pinch more and more, and it’s starting to show.
For the first time since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia is cutting its defense budget. However, spending in another security-related area is increasing. Nevertheless, there are changes in the details. According to economists, the decline points to a structural change in the Russian arms sector.
No growth, gasoline shortages, and new taxes—Russia’s economy is in trouble. In an interview, economist Vladislav Inozemtsev, a former Kremlin economic advisor, explains the three ways in which the war in Ukraine is affecting people, what leverage the West has, and what illusions it would be better to abandon.
In Chernobyl, the power goes out for hours after an attack. Meanwhile, in Russia, another refinery goes up in flames.
For the first time since the start of the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin is cutting its largest budget item—military spending. Why this is no cause for optimism.
By dragging Russia into a long and costly military conflict, the Russian president has created a state of emergency that blocks the way back.
Economic expert Vladislav Inozemtsev discusses why new sanctions against Russia should not be expected.
Strategy. Ukrainians are attacking Russian oil facilities on a large scale. But it is not yet enough to turn the tide of war.
However abstract market capitalization may be, and however far it may diverge from companies’ real assets, stock market trends still shape the fortunes of the world’s wealthiest people.
Vladislav Inozemtsev on why we should not wait for new sanctions.
With VAT rising to finance the war and fuel in short supply, few expect Putin to change his war plans Russia’s economy is in grave danger, Donald Trump assured the world this week, in a dramatic shift in tone on the war in Ukraine, with the US president saying that Kyiv now has a chance to regain all its territory. The Guardian reports.
The Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe (CASE) recently published a provocative study by Vladislav Inozemtsev, “European Russia: The Unobvious Imperative of the 21st Century.” The report urges policymakers in Europe to reconsider long-term strategies toward Russia. Instead of assuming permanent isolation or confrontation, it argues that Europe must prepare for the possibility of transformation inside Russia and be ready with frameworks for conditional integration. Inozemtsev contends that ignoring this possibility would leave Europe unprepared for shifts that could reshape the continent’s security, economics, and political order.
However tentative the market capitalization of commercial firms may be and however huge the gap between their valuation and the real value of their assets may remain, trends in the stock market manifest themselves in the fortunes of the world’s richest people.
With negotations ongoing, there are hopes that the Trump administration can pressure Vladimir Putin into cooperating towards a ceasefire in Ukraine, either through business offers or tougher sanctions. However, Russian economist Dr. Vladislav Inozemtsev argues that the West has very limited economic leverage over Russia, and that Putin has little to gain from ending his war against Ukraine. ‘The main reasons for this war are neither geopolitical nor economic.’
A fire for freedom: Ukraine is targeting fires in Russia’s oil refineries, terminals, and oil depots. However, drones used as kindling are proving largely unsuccessful.
Fifteen years ago, Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev had coffee with President Dmitry Medvedev every Thursday. Today, Inozemtsev lives in exile in Washington, D.C. “As long as the West is on edge and Putin is dead calm, he has the upper hand.”
Despite the rising budget deficit, driven higher by military spending, Russia remains capable of generating the economic resources to sustain the Kremlin’s populism, argues economist Vladislav Inozemtsev.
In recent weeks, few issues have attracted as much attention from experts as the Russian budget forecasts for 2025 and the parameters of the 2026 budget. This is unsurprising: at this point, the budget looks like the Kremlin’s main failure. Officials have long spoken of an economic slowdown, but no one expected such a sharp drop in oil and gas revenues – and even less were they prepared for a budget that had been presented as “structurally balanced” to show a RUB 4.7 trillion shortfall mid-year. Against this backdrop, some commentators are now predicting that the deficit could widen to RUB 6 trillion or even close to RUB 10 trillion.
While VAT is going up to finance the war and fuel is in short supply, few expect Putin to adjust his war plans
Kyiv’s strategy to strike the Russian oil industry is “the most efficient thing Ukraine can do” to hurt Moscow’s war machine. Still, it will not break the army and will not stop Moscow’s war, Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev told Euronews.
According to economist and sociologist Vladislav Inozemtsev, despite being adapted to the war, even if the war is over, the Russian economy will not face a serious crisis, but will even begin to grow. Meanwhile, the authorities claim that the Russian economy is experiencing “technical stagnation” and “slowing growth,” which, according to Inozemtsev, for most citizens will mean stagnation and a slight decrease in income – similar to the situation observed after the annexation of Crimea. The expert predicts a decline in the ruble exchange rate and a reduction in the real incomes of the population. At the same time, he believes that the Russian authorities will find resources to continue financing military operations, and the economic costs will not be of primary importance to the Kremlin.
Russia wants to know what it can expect in the event of a serious incursion into NATO territory and sends a warning signal to the “collective West” to force it to withdraw its support for Ukraine.
The West seems unprepared for confrontation with Russia for many reasons: conscription armies have long been abandoned; arms production has been successfully “optimized,” while military corporations prefer to work “the old way,” preparing for the last war and mainly just raising prices. The moral clarity that allowed a clear distinction to be made between the aggressor and its victims, especially when it comes to distant countries, has been lost; the values of “security” dominate the culture of risk, once so typical of Europeans, writes Vladislav Inozemtsev, co-founder and leading expert of the European Center for Analysis and Strategy, for The Moscow Times.
Russian democratic forces in exile seek representation in the Council of Europe’s Assembly — but will they succeed?
Recently, Vladislav Inozemtsev, co-founder and advisory board member of the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe, published an analytical article on the Riddle website, delving into the deep-rooted causes of Russia’s current economic predicament. The author points out that while surface factors like surging military spending, labor shortages, and budget deficits directly manifest economic pressures, the true crisis stems from the Kremlin’s economic policy shift: The economic crisis navigated in 2022 through marketization and liberalization—such as permitting parallel imports and easing regulations—is now being replaced by a coercive Soviet-style economic model. This shift, characterized by forced import substitution, tax hikes, state-led interventions, and restrictions on migrant labor, is suffocating the private competition and market vitality that previously underpinned economic resilience. The article concludes by emphasizing that this ideologically driven policy reversal—rather than Western sanctions—is undermining the foundations of economic growth. At its core, it represents a political choice by elites to sacrifice economic rationality, signaling deeper crises ahead. The following is a compilation of the article for reference purposes only. The views expressed herein do not represent the stance of the Eurasian New Perspectives Studio.
For the first few days of September, commentators’ attention has been focused on China, where leaders from many non-Western countries have gathered to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory over Imperial Japan in World War II and to flatter the ego of President Xi and a prominent member of his entourage, Vladimir Putin.
Last month, President Donald Trump made an extraordinary attempt to deliver on his election promise and stop Russia’s three-and-a-half-year-long assault on Ukraine. He ignored all the humiliating criticism for effectively dropping his Russia ultimatum and inviting Russian President Vladmir Putin to the U.S. instead; he changed his attitude towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky; he welcomed more European leaders to the White House than any other president, at least in recent years; and, last but not least, he attempted to impose elevated tariffs on India, one of the major buyers of Russian oil. Unfortunately, all these efforts produced no tangible results –Russian officials recently turned down his proposal for a personal Putin-Zelensky meeting, and later the military command in Moscow stated that the “special military operation” would not be terminated any time soon.
So far, Russia’s economy has defied all predictions. But Putin and his security services have now tightened their grip on power so tightly that they are laying the groundwork for their own military defeat, according to a renowned Russian economist.
Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Beijing on Tuesday, on the eve of a major military parade, for what was at least his 45th meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping since both leaders have held power. Their close ties reflect the alliance Russia and China have forged against the West.
After two euphoric years, economic activity in Russia is slowing down. But this downturn, which does not affect the military-industrial complex, seems to have little to do with European Union sanctions.
Vladimir Putin has been restructuring the Russian economy for so long that he does not need economic deals with Donald Trump.
Economist Vladislav Inozemtsev makes the argument that Trump’s diplomacy has created unusually favorable conditions to achieve an end to the Russia-Ukraine war.
Over the last few weeks, developments have taken place that, if they have not radically changed existing political alignments, have at least opened up extensive opportunities for change. The driver of these developments is US President Trump, who now stands to reap either all the rewards or all the blame from the process he has set in motion.
It is still too early to predict the outcome, so for now I will focus only on what can already be analyzed.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, most Western economists predicted an imminent collapse of the Russian economy.
While Donald Trump rolls out the red carpet for Vladimir Putin, the Russian economy is floundering. Does this put Putin under pressure ahead of the Ukraine negotiations?
Trump’s calculations have resulted in a winning combination that could well lead to the end of three and a half years of war.
During the week, there were events that, if not radically changed many political configurations, then opened up a wide range of opportunities for this. President Donald Trump became the initiator of what is happening, and it is he who has a chance to collect all the raptures or all the curses on the outcome of the process launched by him.
The Case economist predicts an agreement unfavorable to Kiev, but that Trump “will try to impose it, forcing them to accept.” Zelensky at the negotiating table? “Possible, but only after something has been decided between Putin and Trump.”
Hit by falling oil revenues and Western sanctions, growth is slowing and the budget deficit has exploded.
The war in Ukraine is beginning to take its toll on the Russian economy, which is facing a sharp slowdown due to falling oil revenues and Western sanctions. It is “on the brink of recession,” acknowledged Maxim Reshetnikov, the economy minister, at the St. Petersburg Forum, Russia’s answer to Davos, in June.
STEM interview with Vladislav Inozemtsev, Russian political scientist, Doctor of Economics, co-founder and head of the European Center for Analysis and Strategy.
Economist Vladislav Inozemtsev gives Donald Trump a hint.
In mid-July, U.S. President Donald Trump once again offered Vladimir Putin a ceasefire in Ukraine in a rather friendly manner. Putin responded with massive shelling of Ukrainian cities. In the United States, they have already started talking seriously, a hundred times more seriously, maybe even two hundred times more seriously, about new absolutely devastating sanctions for Russia. Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal’s bill on 500 percent duties, with which the U.S. is going to punish Russia, has been lying in the Senate for six months, and now it seems as if it has even begun to shake off the dust. Putin continued shelling Ukrainian cities as if there was no Trump. An outraged U.S. president cut Putin some slack. Effectively issued an ultimatum expiring not in 50 days, but in ten. Or in twelve, that’s how lucky you are. What will happen in that ten to twelve days? Unknown, but something terrible. In response, Putin actually sent the American president.
What sanctions is the White House actually preparing? With what could Trump destroy the Russian economy? Vladislav Inozemtsev, Ph.D., co-founder and senior fellow at the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe, explains.
President Trump has become increasingly angry with Russian President Vladimir Putin. For about two months he has been threatening the Kremlin with “secondary” sanctions, which would impose high duties on imports from the nations which continue to purchase Russian energy resources.
What needs to be done now in economic terms to potentially end the war in Ukraine. A guest commentary by Vladislav Inozemtsev.
The US president has gotten himself into a disastrous situation by treating his journey through the Russian quagmire as if it were a stroll through the well-maintained trails of American national parks, warns Vladislav Inozemtsev.
Months ago, economists warned of serious consequences of Russia’s restrictive financial policy. Now these consequences seem to be becoming reality. The country is apparently facing severe cuts – and a striking division.
Economist Dmitry Nekrasov, a former Kremlin adviser who joined the opposition and is now in exile, discusses the new package of sanctions imposed by the European Union against Russia and its potential effectiveness in an interview with Le Monde.
In an interview with Republic, Vladislav Inozemtsev argues that the Russian economy has vast resources, like massive household and corporate deposits at banks, and the system is relatively stable. The main threat is a further ramp-up of military spending, but Inozemtsev believes Putin realizes this and will only increase defense expenditures in line with inflation or by less.
The EU wants to hit “the heart of the Russian war machine” with new sanctions. Moscow is responding calmly, as the economy has so far proved resilient. However, oil revenues are falling, and the state is increasingly drawing on reserves from its wealth fund.
The sanctions are causing damage, but they are also stimulating Russia’s economy.
Vladislav Inozemtsev on why we should not hope for an economic crisis in Russia.
Among the business elite and officials in charge of the economy, one hears dissatisfaction with the amount of money being spent on war. And it seems to be a clear sign that problems have accumulated that will soon reverberate through Putin’s political regime. But it is not wishful thinking. Vladislav Inozemtsev*, economist and co-founder of the CASE Center (European Center for Analysis and Strategies), told Republic in an interview where the Russian economy has real problems in connection with the war, and where there are only fears and worries.
The European Union has adopted a new package of sanctions designed to further penalize Russia’s “ghost fleet,” which is circumventing Western restrictions. However, loopholes and a lack of oversight are greatly undermining their effectiveness.
It was not too calm in Moscow this weekend. Many officials and experts feared the “surprises” that US President Donald Trump promised to Vladimir Putin personally.
It serves as a clear warning that the Russian polity is sinister and unreliable.
The sharp rise in housing and utility prices, frequent internet outages, and the lack of prospects for resolving the conflict with the West have triggered the most visible decline in Putin’s ratings since the fall of 2022.
The population is beginning to feel the cost of the conflict: the last decline dates back to 2022.
The war in Ukraine is hurting Russia’s economy more than it seems.
I make Vladislav Inozemtsev very angry with my pessimism. And he amuses me with his naivety.
In the fourth year of the war, the Kremlin is spreading rumors that Western companies want to return to Russia. But they are nowhere to be found at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.
I would like to dedicate today’s post to an event that no one in Russia will remember, although they should. On July 10, one of the most worthy politicians of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, twice former Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad, celebrates his hundredth birthday, while being in excellent physical and intellectual shape.
While the EU is still searching for its role, Moscow and Beijing are creating facts on the ground. An orbit of satellites is emerging – inaccessible to the West.
On July 2, 2025, the Russian bailiff service officers raided a private Bombardier Global 5000 business jet ready to take off from Chelyabinsk airport for Turkey, preventing its owner, the billionaire politician Konstantin Strukov, from escaping the country.
Strukov, the major stakeholder in one of Russia’s largest gold producers, YuzhUralZoloto and a longtime member of the United Russia party, has been a deputy of Chelyabinsk regional legislature since 2000 and holds the position of deputy chairman of the body since 2020. Earlier that day, the court in Chelyabinsk issued a ruling banning him from leaving Russia and seized his assets following an order from the office of from Russia’s Prosecutor-General’s Office. Strukov is accused of amassing his fortune (he is listed in Russia’s most recent Forbes list as No. 78 with assets valued at $1.9 billion) via scam schemes that involved corruption and misuse of his administrative position. This looks like another case for confiscating the assets of a Russian businessman in favor of the state, which looks quite “normal” these days as more than 400 enterprises valued at at least 2.6 trillion rubles, formerly belonging to the Russian owners, had already changed hands since 2022.
For forty months now, Russia has been at war. An economy burdened by dangerous dependencies on a world based on fossil fuels has been given an additional weight around its legs by the will of its imperial leader that has been dragging it down for far too long. Three and a half years after Vladimir Putin plunged the nation into a “special military operation” and burned all bridges with the West, the Russian economy is – now, according to the claims of its political apparatchiks – literally just above water.
If at the beginning of the SVO the West’s bet was that Russia would not withstand the yoke of sanctions, Now the plan of action has changed – to force the Kremlin to freeze the conflict, counting on subsequent destabilization in the Russian Federation under the weight of economic problemsHowever, this anti-Russian plan may also collapse.
This is discussed on the pages of International Politik Foreign agent economists Vladislav Inozemtsev and Dmitry Nekrasov who fled to the EU.
Few people today can doubt that we all live in a huge information bubble, inflated on purpose, for the sake of attracting attention to “clickable” news in a wide variety of areas – including the economy. It is well known that any stories about disasters and crises are much better read than news about deals and investments.
Many economists argue that Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot “afford” peace with Ukraine, because Russia’s economy would collapse as a result. This is not the case.
The Kremlin is beginning to admit signs of exhaustion after the boom of 2023 and 2024
What the German question was for the 20th century, the Russian question is likely to be for the 21st century: How can Russia, which continues to act in an aggressively imperialistic manner, be integrated into the European Community’s peace project?
Experts have warned for months that the Kremlin ‘can’t afford peace’. As a slump looms — is that really true?
Russia’s economy minister has issued a rare warning that the country is on the verge of recession, breaking with the Kremlin’s usual upbeat messaging and signalling growing concern over the sustainability of its war economy. “Judging by business sentiment at the moment, we’re basically already on the brink of falling into a recession,” Maxim Reshetnikov said on Thursday at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, President Vladimir Putin’s flagship economic event. “The numbers show [the economy] is cooling off,” he added.
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The blunt assessment reflects what Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev believes is a deepening rupture within the government as uncertainty caused by the ongoing war in Ukraine tests the country’s economic resilience. Inozemtsev, who was once an advisor to the Kremlin and is now considered one of the sharpest Putin critics, predicts a split is approaching as soon as September, when budget talks for 2026 begin. “The economic bloc will try to block any kind of military expenditure increase, because this is impossible to manage,” he said. “Last year, when the budget for 2025 was adopted, the figure for military expenditures was 107 percent of oil and gas revenue – that means Putin was looking to spend the entire oil and gas revenue for the military.” He added: “I would say spending is now at around 130 percent. This is already a terrible amount.”
At the same forum, Putin warned against putting the Russian economy into a “cryotherapy chamber” through excessively tight monetary policy. Inozemtsev believes Reshetnikov’s unusually frank comments are a veiled warning to the Kremlin not to escalate military spending further. “The message is that if we continue this way, we will face troubles,” he said. “If Putin wants to increase military spending, or if he wants to say ‘we will fight Ukraine until we prevail and it ceases to exist’ this is a clear insight for recession.”
Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western sanctions aimed to cripple Russia’s economy. However, it weathered them better than expected due to vast economic reserves, size and a war-driven redistribution of wealth to citizens and private businesses.
As of 2025, despite high inflation, rising interest rates and slowing industrial output, Russia’s economy continues to grow modestly, fueled by military-industrial spending and high personal savings.
The ruble has performed strongly, bolstered by high interest rates, even though this has hurt exports. Deposits are at record highs, but investment remains low due to uncertainty.
With US peace efforts under President Donald Trump underway – albeit with very modest progress – the narrative has shifted from “Putin can’t afford war” to “Putin can’t afford peace.” Inozemtsev says that’s “absolutely false”.
“The Russian economy anticipates peace. It waits for peace,” he said. “If the war stops, a new chance for growth will soon emerge … Business will get some kind of certainty, the money will jump into the economy, the rates will go down, and the deposits from the banks will seek more profitable investment.” In fact, he argues, the Russian economy is desperate for predictability – even if that means more war.
“Even if Putin said: we will spend the same amount every year until 2028, or we will fight to victory and no peace talks, the economy would do better than it does now,” he said.
The effect of the slow down on Russian life is hard to quantify as it is felt unevenly across society and sectors, with those reliant on state money and the coal industry the hardest hit.
But one thing is clear to Inozemtsev, who is also the co-founder of think tank the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe, has rarely returned to Russia since opposing the annexation of Crimea in 2014: “If the military expenses are like they are today, and if the oil price is like it is today, Russia can continue one or two years. But if Putin wants more and more and more — I cannot imagine what would happen .”
Vladislav Inozemtsev | Russian economist: The war with Ukraine gave the Russian economy a significant boost. Growth is now slowing down. Peace could ease the strain on the Russian budget, but expert Inozemtsev does not yet see any pressing need for this.
He once advised the Kremlin, but now Vladislav Inozemtsev is considered one of the sharpest critics of the Putin regime. With cool precision, he dissects why the Russian economy continues to function—and why peace with Ukraine is an illusion for the time being. “The sanctions have taken away the view of Russian trade, not trade itself.”
Vladislav Inozemtsev: I was happy to discuss the past and future of the Russian economy with my colleagues today as part of the discussion of the new CSIS report
Lindsey Graham proposes exemption for countries that help Ukraine. The measure, backed by 82 senators, aims to target China, India and other buyers of Russian energy, but risks side effects on Europe and Asian partners
The last few days have been extremely busy, and the amount of news and commentary has been off the charts. The discussion of whether the masterful Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian strategic air bases were analogous to Pearl Harbor or Tsushima dominated the blogosphere for two days – but since yesterday was another day of consultations in Istanbul (generally as inconclusive as before), I would like to focus on more general issues.
Regular increases in war spending have accelerated inflation, interest rates are prohibitively high, and economic growth is slowing down. With oil prices low, Russia can no longer afford to continue on this course without serious adjustments.
The measures against Russia have set dangerous processes in motion, not only the consolidation of the Chinese-Russian alliance.
Despite soaring defense budgets and shrinking oil revenues, Russia continues to finance its prolonged invasion of Ukraine through hidden expenditures and relentless exploitation of energy exports.
The years of growth seem to be over, and the Russian economy is cooling down. What is behind this – and what would peace in Ukraine change?
Vladislav Inozemtsev explains what will happen to the Russian economy if the fighting continues or peace is achieved.
In an op-ed in Le Monde, Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev and Ukrainian researcher Mykola Vorobiov note that calls to the Russian president to stop the war have always been futile. According to them, he will only agree to negotiate if the war becomes dangerous for his own benefit.
Economist Vladislav Inozemtsev tells Republic there is no sense in making forecasts about the Russian economy currently, as we do not whether there will be war or peace in the next year. He also talks about how the Russian budget is doing amid the recent drop in oil prices and constantly rising military spending.
What is happening in the Russian economy today overall? I’m looking at a recent update from the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-term Forecasting. It says there is a decline across a number of sectors. But overall, nothing terrible. Still, several economists believe the economy is stagnating. What can you add to this picture?
Faced with repression, opposition to Vladimir Putin’s government exists, but it is off the radar — it has become imperceptible.
It’s easy to feel lost in Moscow. With constant interruptions to satellite systems for security reasons, mobile phone maps freeze all the time, or worse, lead you completely astray. With GPS disabled by air defense to repel Ukrainian drone attacks, anyone who takes a taxi knows that their destination may be uncertain.
The share of the ruble in payments for Russian imports in the first quarter exceeded half for the first time, reaching 51.7%, according to the Central Bank. The peak (53.5%) was reached in February, and March became the fourth month when most imports were formally paid for in rubles, according to the regulator’s statistics. The share of exports paid for in rubles is also growing: in March, it reached a record 47.6%.
Economist Inozemtsev explains how the war will affect the Russian economy this year.
Hopes that the war could end in 2025 are becoming increasingly illusory. The peace promised by Trump seems unattainable. Meanwhile, the European Union is introducing a new package of sanctions and promising to tighten them further. Russia’s ability to wage war is not unlimited. Although this is true, it still has potential. But someone will have to make sacrifices. Who should prepare for a worsening situation, and who, on the contrary, will still be able to profit from it? Vladislav Inozemtsev, economist and co-founder of CASE Center (European Center for Analysis and Strategy), discusses this in an interview.
INTERVIEW / Russian economist and sociologist Vladislav Inozemtsev, now living in the USA, condemns Putin’s aggressive policy and Russia’s war against Ukraine. In an interview with FORUM 24, he comments on Trump’s economic policy and also comments on Russia and China. According to him, China has no reason to “be angry” with Russia, as it has long been its economic satellite. And on Europe, he notes, “Europe’s full awakening is still a long way off, and everyone is now actively praying that Trump will end his crazy affair with Putin and return to normal.” If the U.S. doesn’t pull out of the Russia-Ukraine talks, it should be much tougher.
Putin is turning Russia into a country without friends and a country without a history to be proud of
The Russian economy is not on the verge of collapse, as the West had hoped. Nevertheless, it needs peace in the medium term. Why is Putin resisting?
Not only have the economic sanctions imposed on Putin’s Russia failed to have the desired effect, but some are actually boosting the Russian economy, argues exiled economist Dmitry Nekrasov. He explains the mechanisms at work in all the areas concerned, from hydrocarbon sales to European visa policy and restrictions on imports into Russia.
Boris Grozovsky’s excellent text from yesterday is hard to leave out – not only because I was unable to participate in the discussion of the initiative itself, to which I was invited by its creators, but also because the concept of the transition period in this case is more detailed and thorough than ever. Despite this, however, I would like to say that I do not have high hopes for the realization of such a strategy.
Trump’s policies are having a contradictory effect on Russia’s economy and Putin’s war. A guest commentary by Vladislav Inozemtsev.
However, there are factors that are strangling Russia’s economy and could lead it into crisis.
From April 14 to 17, 2025, a historic international conference was held on Orcas Island, Washington State, USA, on the traditional lands of the Lummi Nation. The event focused on the situation of Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Arctic and Siberia in both present-day and post-Putin Russia. The conference was organized by the International Indigenous Fund for Development and Solidarity “Batani”, the International Committee of Indigenous Peoples of Russia, the Indigenous Russia information center (iRussia), and Russian America for Democracy in Russia (RADR).
The former advisor to Dmitry Medvedev, now in exile, explains in an article in “Le Monde” that the war and sanctions have not hampered his country’s economy, which is much better prepared for conflict than other powers.
The more the Kremlin de facto rejects the policy of “dealmaker” Donald Trump to quickly bring peace to Ukraine, the more he realizes that he has to offer the USA something economically. However, he has hardly any trump cards.
“D.Trump intends to force his partners to negotiate and get them to make quick and concrete concessions. And we have already learned about the first steps – in fact, almost 70 countries have declared their readiness to seek a compromise,” said economist Vladislav Inozemtsev, who answered Euronews’ questions.
Russia was excluded from US tariffs but would have felt the weight anyway, say experts interviewed by Fanpage.it. Economist Inozemtsev: “Only Brussels can attract China with trade offers and break the axis between Beijing and the Kremlin. Allowing sustainable peace in Ukraine”.
In order to conduct foreign trade settlements under sanctions, large Russian exporters, importers, banks and intermediaries have organized “some analogue of an informal currency exchange outside Russia,” Dmitry Nekrasov, head of the CASE analytical center, writes in the report “International Settlements under Sanctions”. He interviewed about 30 people to find out how the settlements are carried out and what the costs of these schemes are for business and the economy.
The destroyed Nordstream gas pipeline is the subject of negotiations between the USA and Russia about peace in Ukraine. A potentially spectacular solution is approaching.
There are huge amounts of money lying around in Russia’s banks. The economy would need it, and so would the state in view of the high expenditure on the war. Will it soon be taking money from the citizens? And where else could he get money now that the state reserves have melted away?
Voluntaristic disposal of other people’s property has become a trademark of the Russian authorities during the war. Entrepreneurs who set up businesses on their own cannot like this approach. That is why they can become allies of any opposition in a serious fight against the regime.
Recently, the Western press has increasingly started to publish publications about the fact that in addition to the “shadow fleet” Russia has “shadow reserves”. What are these reserves and where do they come from?
Vladimir Jushkin, director of the Baltic Center for Russian Studies, writes about the paradoxes of Russia’s war economy and why it has proven to be resistant to sanctions.
US President Donald Trump, who recently seemed business friendly, is becoming a threat to the stability of the US and global economy. Under the pretext of supporting domestic producers, he introduces new tariffs, which scares the population, producers and the stock market. Economist Vladislav Inozemtsev believes that the main problems will manifest themselves not in those countries whose expansion the U.S. president wants to stop with new duties, but first of all in the United States itself.
The experience of wartime Russia suggests to Europe that increased spending on armaments does not torpedo the economy or the implementation of social programs, writes Vladislav Inozemtsev for “Wyborcza”.
In the European Parliament a month ago, deputies listened to a curious lecture. It was given by a famous thinker who understood a lot about Soviet, Russian and Ukrainian reality.
A new company made up of Americans and Russians could take over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. However, Putin would have to swallow his pride to make that happen.
To ensure global economic prosperity, Donald Trump should draw inspiration from US-China reconciliation rather than allying himself with Vladimir Putin, Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev believes in an article in “Le Monde.”
The long-awaited talks between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin have taken place, and de facto the parties have agreed that they will continue negotiations. But no negotiations will change the main thing: the West has lost.
As the talks aimed at terminating the Russian war in Ukraine are taking shape, experts and politicians speculate whether an armistice or a peace treaty may secure Europe from risks associated with Putin’s imperialistic policies. Dozens of assessments warning about the almost inevitable Russian military incursions into the Baltic states, Poland, or even Germany, are made on a daily basis with some analysts addressing more exotic options like, for example, a military expedition into Svalbard, where the Soviets, and later the Russians have been for a long time developing their economic presence. European governments take these challenges seriously, with some of them trying to prepare for the Russian invasion by 2030, and increasing their military budgets to cope with the growing threat.
Under such an uncertainty it seems important to investigate whether the Kremlin possesses both the desire and the resources to project its aggressive plans beyond the Ukrainian territory. An answer to this question is vital in drafting any consistent strategy for the coming decades for Kyiv and the European powers, whatever the future American attitude to the conflict might be.
The U.S. and Ukrainian proposal for a cease-fire in Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine makes sharply relevant the previously quite utopian thoughts of economic analysts that a peaceful situation would be disastrous for Russia’s economy.
On March 11, 1985, 45 years ago, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union elected 54-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev as its general secretary. Under his leadership, Soviet borders were opened, freedom of speech was not only restored, but also introduced for the first time in Russian history, private property was legalized, free legislative elections were held, and in less than seven years, the last European colonial empire had broken up and disappeared.
The collapse of the Soviet Union created a great wave of revanchism. The condition of freedom and peace that Gorbachev dreamed of 40 years ago has been dismantled by “the new Russian Führer.”
Poles should rely on their defense spending, a strong economy and their own consistent leadership across party lines – in order to consolidate allies around Poland, rather than solicit action from Trump, argues Professor Vladislav Inozemtsev, a Russian economist and opposition figure, in an interview with money.pl.
Dmitry Nekrasov is a politician, economist and director of the European Centre for Analysis and Strategy – “I propose to conduct a thought experiment: the Ukrainian President Zelensky signed an agreement to hand over Ukraine’s natural resources, as US President Donald Trump wants to do. At the same time, there was a ceasefire with Russia, some peacekeepers came to Ukraine and Kyiv received security guarantees.”
In the Vikerraadio series “Harri Tiido’s Background Stories” the opinion paper “The New Restraint. Western strategy on the Moscow-Beijing axis”. The authors are essentially suggesting that corruption and theft in Russia should be allowed to flourish, with the possibility of taking money out of the country, Tiido notes.
What drives Russian people to support the invasion is the perception that “the world is against Russia.”
Europe needs more cohesion, and this requires leadership. Three countries have good prerequisites.
Western sanctions have inflicted heavy losses on Russia. But the shift to a war economy has also led to strong growth and higher incomes.
The Centre de Recherches Europes-Eurasie-CREE (Inalco) is pleased to invite you to a round table entitled: “Russian Economy and Society Three Years into the Invasion of Ukraine: Growth Without Development?”
How does Russia’s economy feel three years after the start of the open invasion of Ukraine? How does it manage to grow despite the sanctions? How and what have prices risen, and why can’t the Central Bank’s tough measures curb inflation? “Voice of America has collected experts’ assessments.
If the great powers had supplied Ukraine in 2014 with the same amount of weapons and money as in 2022, the war would probably never have happened
Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, Director of the Russia-Eurasia Center at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), points out that after three years of conflict in Ukraine, the Russian economy is weakened and remains highly dependent on the evolution of hydrocarbon prices.
As the war in Ukraine enters its third year, the Russian economy, though resilient, is facing a number of difficulties.
Three years into the war, Putin can glimpse victory – thanks to Trump, who is serving Ukraine on a silver platter, according to three prominent exiled Russians who have all turned their backs on their country
The war in Ukraine has reached a stalemate, and a ceasefire appears increasingly likely. Painful compromises with the aggressor may be inevitable. But what comes next?
Donald Trump, from the first days of his presidency, has been radically changing the course of the United States in all key areas. His policy is already creating new geopolitical realities in which America’s traditional allies find themselves in an unclear position. US Vice President D.J. Vance’s speech at the Munich Conference showed that Europe is no longer seen by Washington as a full-fledged partner in the previous format. These changes are leading to serious consequences. The peace talks on Ukraine in Saudi Arabia between representatives of the United States and Russia reveal a new balance of power: Ukraine and Europe are losing their subjectivity in resolving key issues, which means they have to reconsider their strategy. What global processes are now unfolding in the world and how American politics is being transformed?
Interview with Vladislav Inozemtsev
3 Ideas to Explore.
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
Regardless of how Putin’s war in Ukraine ends, the West must adopt a new containment strategy in response not only to the Kremlin leader’s aggression up to now but to prevent more such attacks and to ensure that the West rather than Russia defines the outlines of a new world order, according to three opposition Russian scholars.
Dmitry Gudkov, Vladislav Inozemtsev, and Dmitry Nekrasov suggest that while comparisons with Hitler in 1940 are popular, they ignore two things – Putin has nuclear weapons which Hitler did not, and the Russian people after Ukraine are more like the Russian people in 1945 who didn’t want another war than the Germans of 1939 who believed they could win one
Thanks to impending U.S. concessions to Russia, President Putin has regained some respite. But to one demand from Moscow, the US has not yet responded: will President Trump weaken, maintain or tighten economic sanctions? So far, Western embargoes have not directly weakened Russia. In autarky, the war economy could flourish. But for how long? If everything stays the same, economists say 2025 will be the year of truth. Hubert Smeets outlines Russia’s state and popular economy.
Among President Trump’s provocative ideas that have shocked the world since he returned to the White House, the recent proposal to “clean” the Gaza Strip of the locals and turn it into a flourishing Mediterranean Riviera looks like the most outrageous. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt called it an example of “outside of the box” thinking. It looks ill-grounded and premature from many points of view.
The West needs to prepare for a new cold war to exhaust Russia economically, according to the authors of the report “New Containment” Dmitry Gudkov, Vladislav Inozemtsev and Dmitry Nekrasov
I am sometimes criticized for assessing the potential for the sustainability of the Russian economy as very significant and thereby mocking the dreams of domestic oppositionists about the imminent collapse of the regime they hate. Today I will try to play the role of Aibolit and bring tubes of balm that can heal their mental wounds a little.
Any agreement with Russia to end its war against Ukraine, which would involve accepting territorial losses, would be extremely dangerous. Such a deal would not only encourage the Russian governments, but also other revisionist governments. It would be the end of the post-war order.
Poorly calibrated and sometimes counterproductive, the Western measures against Moscow since 2022 have had an economic impact far from that expected. But key sectors, big users of technology, are starting to be affected.
The Kremlin boasts of a 4% increase in GDP last year despite sanctions, enough to continue financing its war effort, some experts estimate.
Interview with Dmitry Gudkov
The slowdown is worrying for the Kremlin but not serious enough to significantly hobble its war effort.
Author Vladislav Inozemtsev highlights Russia’s preparedness for a prolonged military campaign, with stable economic growth and increased military recruitment, contrasting it with Ukraine’s challenges in securing additional Western support and facing a deteriorating internal situation. Inozemtsev argues that a resolution may only come if Western allies propose an armistice agenda, as neither side appears willing or able to make significant concessions.
The article explores how Russia’s economy has surpassed initial negative forecasts despite Western sanctions following President Vladimir Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. According to the article, the Russian economy’s unexpected growth, with GDP increasing by 3.6% in 2023 and projected to grow by 3.2% in 2024, is primarily driven by massive military spending, sanctions evasion, and redirection of exports to friendly nations like China. However, this “war addiction,” characterized by unsophisticated production and heavy military expenditure—now accounting for 40% of Russia’s budget—is unsustainable in the long term. The article draws attention to several vulnerabilities: inflation, labor shortages, and reduced social investments. These factors may trigger future economic challenges, particularly as military spending continues to rise, while sectors like education and healthcare are underfunded.
Vladislav Inozemtsev, an expert at the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe (CASE), is cited for describing Russia’s current growth model as one of “growth without development.” The article warns that Putin’s strategy could lead to an economic crash once military spending decreases, and suggests that more stringent Western sanctions could exacerbate Russia’s economic strain in the near future.
At the Free Russia Forum in Lithuania, Dmitry Nekrasov, General Director of the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe, delivered a thought-provoking speech highlighting the miscalculations surrounding the stability of the Russian economy and the impact of Western sanctions. He argued that the European Union’s sanctions policy has largely failed to achieve its desired outcomes. Initial expectations that sanctions would severely damage the Russian economy have proven overly optimistic. In fact, in some cases, poorly designed sanctions have inadvertently benefited the Russian government and economy. Nekrasov pointed out that Russia’s defense spending, which currently stands at 6% of its GDP, is sustainable over the long term, referencing historical data that shows many countries in the 20th century sustained even higher defense expenditures without suffering economic collapse. Despite the ongoing war, Russia’s budget deficit is remarkably low, and the economy has shown an unexpected level of resilience, with sectors such as construction hitting record growth.
Nekrasov also addressed the inefficacy of financial sanctions imposed on Russian oligarchs and private capital, noting that these measures have had the opposite effect of what was intended. Instead of stimulating capital flight, they have driven capital back into Russia, effectively becoming a “gift” to the Kremlin. Furthermore, Russia’s net investment position has increased by $450 billion during the war, excluding the frozen reserves. He emphasized that the biggest strategic mistake made by the West was the assumption that a quick, forceful blow would collapse the Russian economy. Instead, Russia has adapted to the sanctions, rendering them ineffective in the long term. Nekrasov concluded that to truly weaken the Russian economy, a complete overhaul of the sanctions strategy is needed, with a focus on stimulating capital and human talent outflows from Russia and tightening control over dual-use technologies.
Interview with Dmitry Nekrasov
Dmitry Nekrasov, CEO of the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe, notes that the imposition of sanctions against the Moscow Stock Exchange and the regulation of the ruble exchange rate are not significant events and are only overblown by the media. Sanctions, in his opinion, initially could not stop the war in Ukraine, although they damaged the Russian economy. Effective sanctions work in the long term, but for real pressure on Russia, it is necessary to focus on key restrictions, such as oil exports. Nekrasov believes that the sanctions policy should be more targeted, and the current measures have a limited impact.
Interview with Dmitry Nekrasov
Dmitry Gudkov discusses the prospects of anti-war emigration from Russia in an interview, emphasizing the importance of obtaining foreign passports. A CASE report on a new wave of Russian emigration was presented in Paris, which revealed the economic potential of Russian relocators for EU countries. The study covers three waves of emigration, analyzing motivation, political views and the intention to return to their homeland. The results showed that the recent waves of emigrants are predominantly anti-Putin and anti-war, and their presence is beneficial for the economies of the host countries.
Interview with Dmitry Gudkov
An interview with Vladislav Inozemtsev highlights a study conducted by the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe, which analyzes modern Russian emigration. A new wave of emigrants are young, highly educated people who oppose Putin and the war with Ukraine. The study highlights that this group can serve as an example for developing an effective migration policy in Europe. Inozemtsev also notes that the Russian expert environment is often politicized, and emphasizes the importance of an objective and unemotional analysis of current events and economic conditions.
Interview with Vladislav Inozemtsev
The article discusses a pioneering sociological study that examines the experiences of Russians who have fled to Europe due to the war in Ukraine. This diaspora, which has integrated into European societies, represents a significant demographic shift. The study’s authors suggest that the presence of these exiled Russians could be strategically leveraged to confront Vladimir Putin’s regime. By highlighting the integration and potential political influence of this new Russian diaspora, the research sheds light on a unique aspect of the ongoing conflict and its broader implications.
Opposition Russian politicians Dmitry Gudkov and Dmitry Nekrasov told why the EU should facilitate entry for Russians. They conducted a study of the Russian diaspora and present its results to European politicians. In their opinion, by opening the doors to highly qualified Russians, the EU will be able to weaken Putin’s regime and solve the problem of shortage of workers in Europe.
Interview with Dmitry Gudkov, Dmitry Nekrasov
A group of exiled Kremlin critics has urged the EU to welcome more Russians fleeing Putin’s regime, arguing that this would weaken Russia’s wartime economy by causing a skilled worker shortage. Despite up to a million Russians having fled since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many are returning due to job and visa challenges. Dmitry Gudkov, a Russian opposition politician, presented a study in Paris showing that 80% of surveyed Russians in the EU left after 2014, with 44% fleeing post-2022 invasion. The study, conducted by the University of Nicosia and a new think tank CASE, surveyed over 3,200 Russians in various EU countries.
Speaking at the French Institute of International Relations, Gudkov unveiled a study of the Russian diaspora in several EU member states, one of the first attempts to study the Ukraine war-triggered exodus.
A group of exiled Kremlin critics has urged the EU to welcome more Russians fleeing Putin’s regime, arguing that this would weaken Russia’s wartime economy by causing a skilled worker shortage. Despite up to a million Russians having fled since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many are returning due to job and visa challenges. Dmitry Gudkov, a Russian opposition politician, presented a study in Paris showing that 80% of surveyed Russians in the EU left after 2014, with 44% fleeing post-2022 invasion. The study, conducted by the University of Nicosia and a new think tank CASE, surveyed over 3,200 Russians in various EU countries
Russian opposition forces propose a “relocatee card” to facilitate immigration from Russia to the EU, allowing easy access to residence permits, banking, and employment. They argue that the emigration of educated and affluent Russians could weaken Russia’s economy and challenge Putin’s regime. A study by the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe (CASE) found that 82% of Russian relocatees in the EU have higher education and 62% earn over 3,000 euros monthly, significantly contributing to the EU economy. The report will be presented at key European institutions.
Speaking at the French Institute of International Relations, Gudkov unveiled a study of the Russian diaspora in several EU member states, one of the first attempts to study the Ukraine war-triggered exodus.
A group of Kremlin critics who have fled Russia are calling on EU states to take in more Russian opposition members. The focus should primarily be on skilled workers in order to weaken the Russian war economy.
At the French Institute of International Relations, Russian opposition politician and former lawmaker Dmitry Gudkov unveiled a study of the Russian diaspora in several EU member states, one of the first attempts to study the Ukraine war-triggered exodus.
The news article discusses a proposal suggesting that Europe should welcome 3 million Russians, which could potentially remove 500 billion euros from Vladimir Putin’s regime. Despite efforts over the past two years to block money and high-tech goods from entering Russia, the West has not focused on encouraging the exodus of financial resources and human capital from the country. The proposal aims to weaken Putin’s regime by facilitating this strategic outflow.
For over two years, the West has been trying to block the inflow of money and high-tech goods to Russia — but has done nothing to stimulate the outflow of both financial resources and human capital.
A group of exiled Kremlin critics has urged the EU to welcome more Russians fleeing Putin’s regime, arguing that this would weaken Russia’s wartime economy by causing a skilled worker shortage. Despite up to a million Russians having fled since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many are returning due to job and visa challenges. Dmitry Gudkov, a Russian opposition politician, presented a study in Paris showing that 80% of surveyed Russians in the EU left after 2014, with 44% fleeing post-2022 invasion. The study, conducted by the University of Nicosia and a new think tank CASE, surveyed over 3,200 Russians in various EU countries.
Speaking at the French Institute of International Relations, Gudkov unveiled a study of the Russian diaspora in several EU member states, one of the first attempts to study the Ukraine war-triggered exodus.
According to the research made by Center for Analyses and Strategies in Europe, Cyprus has become the most “russified” EU member state, with Russians comprising over 6% of the population and up to one-third in major cities. From 2016 to 2022, Russians with permanent residency permits increased 4.6 times, and Belarusians 3.8 times. Russians and Belarusians now hold 26.4% of all valid residency permits. In the Information and Communication sector, 42% of Russians and 48% of Belarusians work, earning significantly more than the average Cypriot salary.
The news article reports that exiled Kremlin critics are urging the EU to welcome more skilled Russians fleeing Vladimir Putin’s regime. They argue that facilitating this migration would weaken Russia’s wartime economy by creating a shortage of skilled workers. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, up to a million people have left Russia, but some are returning due to job scarcity and visa issues. Russian opposition activist Dmitry Gudkov emphasized that reducing Russia’s skilled workforce directly impacts its military capabilities. Speaking at the French Institute of International Relations, Gudkov presented a study on the Russian diaspora in EU countries, including France and Germany.
The news article reports on a call from exiled Kremlin critics for EU countries to actively welcome skilled Russians fleeing Vladimir Putin’s regime. The critics argue that by providing refuge and opportunities to these individuals, the EU could exacerbate the shortage of skilled workers in Russia, thereby weakening the country’s economy during wartime. This strategy aims to leverage the migration of talented Russians as a means to undermine Putin’s regime.
Kremlin critics in exile have called on the EU to accept more Russians fleeing Putin’s regime, arguing that it would deal a blow to the country’s military economy. Dmitry Gudkov, a Russian opposition politician, presented a study showing that about a million Russians have left the country since 2022. Of these, 80% left after the annexation of Crimea, and 44% — after the invasion of Ukraine. A study conducted by the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe suggests an economic migration program for qualified Russians, which could weaken the Putin regime and give a boost to the EU economy.
A group of Kremlin critics in exile on Tuesday called on European Union (EU) countries to do more to accommodate Russians fleeing President Vladimir Putin’s regime, arguing that a shortage of skilled workers would hit the country’s economy during the war.