At the beginning of the fourth year of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the quarter-century anniversary of Putin’s rule, there is little room for doubt that the West’s policy towards Moscow has been a failure. We can argue about the reasons, but the fact remains that the Russian revisionist regime is now the main security threat in Europe and it appears to remain so for a long time to come.
It is particularly worrying that the current conflict — quite in the spirit of Kremlin propaganda — is seen by many intellectuals and politicians as an inter-civilizational confrontation, the reasons for which are seen in the “Asian,” “imperial,” or “totalitarian” nature of Russia and its people’s traits. In our opinion, what is happening today is caused by other reasons — first of all, by the fact that Russia in the 20th century was significantly behind European countries in understanding the modern world and still acts according to the canons of the old but rather European politics. Its aggression against neighboring Ukraine is an echo of imperial claims from previous centuries20, and the best response to it can be a new edition of the big pan-European initiative.
20 — See: Abalov, Alexander and Inozemtsev, Vladislav. Endless Empire: Russia in Search of Itself, Moscow: Alpina Publisher, 2021, cc. 29-34.
We would like to recall that the rather formalized ideas of a pan-European confederation were put forward almost simultaneously by British, French, Italian21 and even German intellectuals and politicians during the most terrible years of WW2 in attempts to prevent a repetition of its horrors for European peoples. In our view, Europe is now at a similar moment, and should have been guided by the same logic, especially since there is already visible evidence of the effectiveness those measures showed earlier. We would add that in recent decades, Russia and Europe have remained integrated on a cultural level: up to 6 million Russians and people of Russian origin reside permanently or temporarily in the EU, with very few people feeling they represent a cultural tradition alien and incomparable to Europe. Unlike during WW1 or WW2, millions of the aggressor country’s citizens coexist peacefully with Europeans without sharing the aspirations and rhetoric of the aggressor’s government (we share the European authorities’ fears about Kremlin agents being infiltrated, but we would like to point out that Russians in Europe have not been seen at all in acts of terrorism, vandalism or public order offences motivated by hatred or rejection of European history and way of life, often committed, for example, by Muslim immigrants). According to a study by CASE, the European Centre for Analysis and Strategy, the Russians of the latest relocation wave (2022-2025), are not only beneficial to the host countries’ economies, but are also European in their mindset: 75% have higher education (the EU average is around 45%); 74% are openly anti-Putin, 64% are openly pro-Ukraine; and earn above the EU average: between €1000 and €3000 per month.
21 — In this case it is worth mentioning the “Ventotene Manifesto” of 1941 (see more: Arban, Erika. Italian Regionalism and the Federal Challenge Reconciling Economic Regionalism and Solidarity. New York, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, pp. 50-54).
There’s a reason we began our report with an assessment of the numerous conflicts that have previously taken place in the European continent. In our opinion, the most large-scale wars and confrontations of the past nearly 150 years have been intra-European in their essence, generated by European contradictions, ideologies and interests. The key to ending them lies precisely in comprehending them as such and in further enlarging Greater Europe in order to turn it into an area of peace and security. We understand today’s emotional calls for blaming the entire Russian population for the ongoing war, appeals to create a new Iron Curtain on the EU’s eastern borders, and requests for the collapse and partition of Russia in post-war Germany’s fashion. However, we believe that all these measures are counterproductive for the creation of a peaceful Europe of the future.
In advocating the project of complete and formalized integration of Russia into Europe, we proceed solely from rational considerations. First of all, we draw attention to the fact that, unlike Germany during WW1 and WW1, today’s authoritarian Russia cannot be defeated militarily. The world’s largest nuclear arsenal under the Kremlin’s control makes any such ambitions meaningless, and any form of civil war or partition of Russia very dangerous (recently, Western politicians have increasingly admitted that Ukraine has not received and will not receive weapons that would allow it to dislodge Russian troops, precisely out of fear of a possible nuclear escalation). In addition, we believe that the possibility of nations and states being set in motion by ideologies are a thing of the past (even Putin’s political technologists have not come up with a comprehensible ideology for Russians, limiting themselves to “patriotism”, but they still insist that society should accept its role as a mere “support” for the state22). Therefore all decisions about Europe’s future should be made with potential benefits, not phobias and prejudices in mind. Finally, we believe that Russia has not reached a level of indoctrination comparable to that of Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s USSR — and this opens up the possibility of a peaceful and organized transformation of the country, should a significant part of its population find it beneficial and appealing.
22 — See Kharichev, Alexander. “Civilization “Russia”” / Notebook of civic education, 2025, MarchApril, pp. 4-10.
However, this understanding will not come to Russians on its own — and if it does, it will be met with great skepticism, as the feeling of exclusion from the Western world is stronger and more persistent than ever. Overcoming it could change a lot: the feeling of external support has often been a trigger for resistance even when it seems pointless. At the same time, expressing such support now requires no resources or effort on the part of Western governments, but not taking a proactive stance could prove very costly.
The war in Ukraine will come to an end sooner or later. Regardless of where the line of demarcation is drawn and how the ceasefire will be formalized, both the U. S. and European countries will begin to restore relations with Russia (this is evident today in D. Trump’s rhetoric — and we have no doubt that the Europeans will to some extent align their policies with Washington’s course). The outcome will be a devious peace based on private concessions, non-public agreements and electoral gains. Under the pretext of following the ideas of Realpolitik, the West can once again start negotiating with the dictator23, deluding itself that there are decent people in his entourage; that Russia’s alienation will only strengthen isolationist sentiments; and its rapprochement with China will strengthen the position of global anti-Western forces. We would be happy if all this did not happen — but there is no hope for it, such are the realities of international politics. The alternative is a clear position, which can be called “pro-Russian but anti-Putin” (here one cannot help but recall an analogy in the form of the famous phrase of A. Mikhnik, who calls himself an “anti-Soviet Russophile” [59]): Europe could back up “integration of Russia without Putin.” If there is a widespread saying in Russia, “When there’s Putin, there’s Russia; when there’s no Putin, there’s no Russia,” why not make it clear that “When there’s Putin, there’s no Russia in Europe; when there’s no Putin, there’s European Russia”? A single official statement about the EU’s readiness to accept Russia into its ranks can give the Russian population a new vision of the historical perspective. It is worth mentioning that Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are on their path of transformation and struggle against authoritarian trends, largely fuelled by the hope for a European perspective — hope that Russia has never experienced.
23 — A manifesto of this approach is the article: Mearsheimer, John. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin” / Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, 2014, September/October, pp. 77-88.
Finally, we assume that after a brief era of relative stability and peace, humanity may face a period of serious geopolitical upheaval — and the main line of confrontation is likely to be the border between the Eurocentric (“Euro-Atlantic”) civilization and the Global South. It can already be confidently asserted that Europe is the weakest link in this scenario: it has neither the technological potential of the United States nor the industrial capabilities of China. The emerging world of the 21st century may turn out to be the most hostile for Europeans for at least the last 500 years. Even united, the states of Western Europe now control a much smaller share of the world’s population, territory and economy than at any time since the mid16th century. This situation makes feuds and conflicts within Greater Europe seem like madness that must be put to stop.
We are naturally aware that the Russian voice today may not be taken seriously by everyone, and for good reason. But we are convinced that no tyrannical regime is eternal, and the memory of no war determines the history of the following centuries. The Eurocentric world of the 19th and 20th centuries produced economic and political standards that seemed — but never became — universal for a time. Today we are entering a period of new alliances and unions that will shape the future world, in which it will be difficult for the current EU, let alone current Russia, to survive and develop alone. The consolidation of societies and peoples with a common European history is an imperative in this new environment — and even if it seems more obvious to us just because we feel more vulnerable than Europeans today, this is no reason to ignore us. We call on all European politicians, activists and intellectuals to join the search for options and ways to further expand and develop the pan-European initiative, as a delay of thereof means historic defeat.