The demarcation of strategic interest areas and “spheres of influence” culminated in the establishment of Soviet puppet regimes in Eastern Europe along with the proclamation of West Germany, East Germany, and the People’s Republic of China. Even though the “Soviet-controlled area” was never officially recognized by the West, it was de facto considered the part of the world the Soviet Union held its sway over. Later, researchers coined the term “the Brezhnev doctrine” to refer to the Eastern Bloc nations only enjoying limited sovereignty. Under this approach, Western governments avoided meddling in the domestic affairs of Central European states even after the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 and the 1968 Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Oddly enough, the dynamic of the Russia–West relations in the 1990s suggested following the same policy. The boundary separating the spheres of influence moved markedly eastward as the former Warsaw Pact member states were now recognized as the integral part of the Western world. These countries all joined NATO between 1990 and 2004, and the E.U. between 1990 and 2007. The same opportunity was capitalized on by the Baltic states, which were recognized as the territories occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940. In the meantime, the other independent republics that were spawned following the collapse of the Soviet Union were unofficially excluded from the West’s sphere of influence. Furthermore, the West’s non-interference correlated with the extent of Russia’s formal sway over these nations. One good example would be Belarus. The West’s policy toward this country has been slightly reminiscent of its treatment of the Soviet-era Czechoslovakia. Indeed, Moscow threw its full support behind Alexander Lukashenko’s tyrannical crackdown on political protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, only to face no backlash from the West, save for— as was the case with Czechoslovakia—Europe’s willingness to accept dozens of thousands of refugees. A similar stance has been adopted toward most of the EAEU and CSTO member states.
In our opinion, part of the reason Ukraine was targeted by Russia’s aggressive policy is the West’s half-hearted stance toward Ukraine in terms of both political declaration and actual policy-making. The Kremlin has always viewed Ukraine as an undisputed sphere of influence. Although the West did not recognize it as such, it never really attempted to coopt Ukraine into its strategic interest area. For example, the E.C.–Poland Association Agreement was signed on December 16, 1991, even before the Soviet Union was formally disbanded. In 1997, Europe granted Poland’s application as a candidate state. In April 2003, the country acceded into the E.U. Ukraine, on the other hand, only made a move in 2014 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But it was not until the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine that it was granted official candidacy in June 2022. The same is true of NATO. While many of Ukraine’s neighboring states joined the alliance as early as 1999, the jury is still out on Ukraine’s membership prospects.
Ukraine was, too, divided on its status. Almost all of the elections called in recent history pointed to the polarized pro-Russian and pro-Western demographics, both substantially represented by Ukrainian citizens. On the one hand, that ambiguity fueled a visceral grudge on the part of the Russian elite as the country, they insisted, acted “in breach of the existing accords,” something that had never been articulated, let alone signed, in the first place. On the other hand, Putin was misled to believe that reclaiming Ukraine as part of Russia’s sphere of influence would not face more pushback from the West than did the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 and the 1968 Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia. In other words, a lack of the well-defined separation between the strategic interest areas and of the “red lines” catapulted the odds of a hot war.
Before proceeding with the historical parallels, we must admit that (1) the West currently lacks the resolve and willingness to invest more resources in the concerted effort to help Ukraine withstand Russia’s aggression, and (2) the collapse of the Putin regime and Russia’s subsequent transformation are both the indefinitely long-term contingencies that are out of the West’s scope.
These two indisputable facts along with the winding down of the Ukraine war’s hot phase make Eastern Europe’s plight eerily reminiscent of a much earlier epoch. Beginning in the 1950s, the confrontation between the Eastern Bloc and the West shifted toward the global arena while staying away from the use of force in Europe.
Just as it happened in the mid-to-late 20th century, a shift in the geopolitical balance may result from either a political crisis in Russia or a new Russian administration’s willingness to rejoin the Western development trajectory, something that was done by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s.
To set the record straight, we are not advocating the demarcation of strategic interest areas as a fair and valid practice. The point is that if the West has no better option but to stick to this policy, it would be illadvised to have to deal with a whole gamut of its downsides while failing to do the single biggest positive thing, that is, lowering the odds of a further escalation.
No amount of binding international agreements or alliance memberships prevented the Eastern Bloc from crumbling once the Soviet Union hit a protracted rough patch. Meanwhile, the seemingly transient legal underpinnings behind the conclusion of the Korean War have led to the state border being observed for more than 70 years now. The balance of power has not swung enough to change it. However, both of these “red line” scenarios helped to avoid a hot war, as both sides in both cases had a clear idea of the critically important demarcation line.
The pivotal principles of international law, the punishment inflicted on the aggressor, and etc. suggest a single version of the Ukraine state borders: the 1991 borders. Any other scenario may vary from the current frontlines, but it will be neither fairer nor final. If Ukraine succumbs to Russia pressuring it out of joining NATO, it will violate the state sovereignty and will be dismissed by many Ukrainians as an unfair outcome. Rather than being sculpted by the currently offered legal framework, the revision of both scenarios will be heavily reliant on the future balance of power.
We further see the use of terms “demarcated strategic interest areas” and “red lines” as a legitimate turn of phrase, as both may suggest refusing to acknowledge any violation of the internationally recognized borders. After all, the end of World War II did not have the important European borders enshrined shortly thereafter. Instead, it was the Berlin Crisis of 1961 that prompted the construction of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, both West and East Germany joined the U.N. as late as 1973.
The choice of a better legal move capable of facilitating a ceasefire is a complicated matter that should be pursued separately. But what we are doing here is substantiating the need for an unambiguous actual demarcation, which could then be officially enshrined using a varied and flexible legal toolset without these borders having to be internationally recognized.