When describing the process of citizens exiting Russia, 21st-century researchers tend to use terminology that was formed a long time ago and under very different circumstances, calling those who leave the country emigrants. In a number of cases, this approach is completely justified; this is what John Herbst and Sergey Erofeev called the Russians who moved either to the United States (US) or to Western European countries, starting from the early 2000s, in their fundamental study “Putin’s Exodus”. Most of these people, leaving Russia in relatively “quiet” times – starting from Putin’s first term in the Kremlin and up to the “peaceful” annexation of Crimea – could be seen as potential emigrants. From the very start of their adventure, they perfectly understood their life strategies; they bought real estate in advance in their prospective countries of residence, launched new businesses abroad, built successful professional careers, and won contests for prestigious positions in Western corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Even those who did not achieve dizzying success went to new countries to work and live in them, hoping to become a natural part of these societies in due course. At that time, one of us called this group “the Russian professionals,” contrasting them with “professional Russians” who (residing mainly in the post-Soviet countries) were proud of belonging to the “Russian world”, praised “Mother Russia,” and did not strive for any kind of integration into their new societies.
Russia’s continuous shift to confrontation with the West after 2014, and especially the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has greatly changed both the nature and the dynamics of outward migration from Russia. When, almost immediately after Putin’s address to the nation, in February and March 2022, hundreds of thousands of Russians decided to flee their sweet and beloved homeland, they spontaneously began to label themselves not as emigrants but as “relocants” – thereby emphasizing that their status came from unexpected circumstances and, according to their own calculations, was temporary rather than permanent. We would argue that this seemingly insignificant issue points to one of the most important peculiarities of contemporary Russian migration: those leaving the country do not consider themselves to be excluded from it, and this determines the uncertain and dualistic nature of their position and their behavior abroad. On the one hand, they largely retain their Russian identity, which means that they react and will react in the future to all major events taking place in Russia, to the actions the West takes towards Russia (and Ukraine), and to changes in Russian public opinion, as well as to those actions the Russian authorities can take vis-à-vis either the “relocants” in general or groups of them. On the other hand, one may assume that, for a relatively long time, migrants will prefer not to integrate deeply into their new societies, assessing all the possible consequences of undertaking such a step and weighing both the rights that arise for them and the obligations caused by their prospective status (this is already quite noticeable in Israel, where many of those arriving from Russia and other post-Soviet states to acquire Israeli citizenship almost immediately leave for other countries as a permanent residence, not to say that many simply return to Russia).
All this, as well as the uncertainty prevailing both among relocants and Western policymakers and political analysts concerning the prospects of today’s Russia, suggests that, for at least the next two to three years, the aims and intentions of the newcomers will not become finally determined, which is what makes especially relevant a discussion about attitudes to them in Europe.