The wave of Russian emigration prompted by the war differs significantly from most of the migration flows observed today from other countries. The differences can be seen in the reasons for departure, the social make-up, and even in the models of integration into host countries.
Russian immigrants almost do not form regional associations or diasporas. Most are driven by the willingness to integrate into the new social system through personal effort, without expecting support from fellow countrymen. None of the host countries of the “new wave” migrations exhibits anything resembling Chinatown or Brighton Beach, much less closed ethnic or religious communities of immigrants from Asia and the Middle East, who persistently cultivate their specific norms in the host country. There is also no attempt to bring along numerous family members. However, compared to migrants from other countries, a lower tendency to form cohesive diasporas was observed even in relation to previous waves of migration from Russia and the late Soviet Union.
Russian immigrants more often rely on their own strength and do not consider the state obliged to provide generous social assistance. Lessons learned from the Soviet past have rendered Russian immigrants immune to the social redistributive leftist ideology. This also markedly sets their behavior and attitudes apart from those of migrants in the E.U. from many other countries. For example, 60.7% of surveyed Russians in the E.U. countries prefer to rely more on themselves than they do on the government.
Three-quarters of those who relocated within the latest wave left Russia for political rather than economic reasons. They do not seek to spread Putin-era Russian values in their host countries. Moreover, their own value systems are, on average, much closer to Western standards than to those of Russian society. To put it into perspective, 43.5% of labor migrants arriving in Russia prioritize Sharia norms over secular laws. Many migrants from other countries in the E.U. also often tend to import their own practices and customs into the host countries. Russian immigrants are very far from doing so. They are not united by a common hub such as a church, officers’association, or newspaper (as was the case with the White émigré wave a century ago) and more resemble a collection of atomized individuals, not at all inclined to collectively reshape their new environment according to collective notions of the good. The collective identity of these people is rather vague.
Inasmuch as the Russian relocation to the transit zone is somewhat unified, it is more likely due to the adverse factors: a general dislike of Putin’s regime and his policies.
In the countries covered by our study, only 4% supported Russia in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, compared to 70% supporting Ukraine—a nearly 20-fold difference. The native population in any of the host countries shows a noticeably lower level of support for Ukraine in this conflict.
Each subsequent wave of relocation carried an increasing dislike for Russia’s policies. In E.U. countries, among those who left before 2014, 56% disapproved of Putin’s policies either fully or partially. Among those who left after the start of the full-scale invasion, the number of disapprovers increased to 66%. Among those who left after the mobilization was announced, this figure reached 79%. In transit countries, among those who left Russia after the Crimea occupation but before the full-scale invasion, 74% condemned Putin’s policies; among later emigrants (since February 2022), this number already amounted to 89%–91%.