When masterminding his bold attack on Ukraine, Vladimir Putin most likely anticipated a quick and decisive victory. The first few weeks of the “special military operation” resulted in the occupation of over 20% of Ukrainian territory and brought significant successes to the Russian army on all fronts. The losses of these first days of the war came as an unpleasant surprise, but the Kremlin resorted only to announcing a sharp and immediate increase in death gratuities and injury compensations without substantially changing the overall principles of military pay.
However, within a few months, the severity of the fighting and the scale of Russian losses were obvious.
By July 2022, when the Russian forces established their control over the largest ever portion of Ukrainian territory38, some units and formations were almost completely exterminated39 and the need for reinforcements was acute. Since mercenary units— and notably those of the “Wagner PMC”—proved to be the most combat-ready40, the Kremlin agreed to authorize additional recruitment, including from among convicted criminals held in prisons and other detention facilities. However, this process, quickly noted by the media41, was able to supply no more than 15,000 to 20,000 new soldiers at the time (in total, up to 40,000 prisoners were recruited by “Wagner” in 2022–202342), and seemed clearly insufficient against the backdrop of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which convinced the Russian leadership that only mobilization could improve the situation. Announced on September 21, 2022, it was conducted amidst chaos and disarray, and produced many negative consequences; at least 800,000 people fled the country in panic, the economy faced a sharp labor shortage, thousands of businesses all across the country were disrupted43, and, after all, the efficiency of those mobilized, often being dispatched to the frontline poorly equipped and lacking even minimal military training, remained notoriously low44.
38 — S. Jones and R. McCabe, “Russia’s Battlefield Woes in Ukraine”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 3, 2025, available at: www.csis.org.
39 — P. Stewart, “CIA director estimates 15,000 Russians killed in Ukraine war”, Reuters, July 20, 2022, available at: www.reuters.com.
40 — A. Prikhodko, “Geroi našego vremeni: v čem fenomen ČVK ‘Vagner’” [Heroes of our time: what is the phenomenon of PMC Wagner?], Pravda.ru, March 13, 2023, available at: https://military.pravda.ru.
41 — A. Pavlova and E. Nesterova, “‘V pervuû očered’ interesuût ubijcy i razbojniki – vam u nas ponravitsâ’. Pohože, Evgenij Prigožin lično verbuet naemnikov v koloniâh” [“First of all, we’re interested in murderers and robbers— you’ll like it here.” It seems that Yevgeny Prigozhin personally recruits mercenaries in the colonies], Mediazona, August 6, 2022, available at: https://zona.media.
42 — I. Grebeniuk, “Žurnalisty podsčitali, skol’ko zaklûčennyh zaverbovala ČVK ‘Vagner’ v rossijskih koloniâh i skol’ko pogiblo vo vremâ šturma Bahmuta” [Journalists have calculated how many prisoners were recruited by PMC “Wagner” in Russian colonies and how many died during the storming of Bakhmut], Nastoâŝee vremâ, June 11, 2024, available at: www.currenttime.tv.
43 — A. Zlobin, “Biznes ocenil posledstviâ mobilizacii huže eë prâmogo vliâniâ na pokazateli” [Businesses rated the consequences of mobilization worse than its direct impact on performance], Forbes Russia, November 2, 2022, available at: www.forbes.ru.
44 — S. Pominov, “Kak mobilizaciâ 2022 goda otrazilas’ na nastroeniâh v vojskah. Mnenie bojcov iz zony SVO” [How the 2022 mobilization affected the mood of the troops. Opinion of fighters from the SVO zone], Daily Storm, September 21, 2023, available at: https://dailystorm.ru.
However, this “partial mobilization”, carried out in panic and resulting in a number of alarming consequences, set deathonomics in motion. Trying to forestall potential discontent, Vladimir Putin announced that mobilized soldiers would receive a “resumption allowance” of 100,000 rubles, available immediately45; just one month later, this amount was raised to 195,000 rubles, with many receiving the increased pay retroactively from the moment they had been deployed46. These same 195,000 rubles were proclaimed the minimum monthly wage for mobilized soldiers, being simultaneously extended to those contract soldiers who had been fighting since the start of the war. Thus, taking into account some additional insurance payments, the total compensation for the death of a serviceman by the end of 2022 increased to 10.5 to 11 million rubles47 (or almost $200,000 at the exchange rate at the time). Moreover, any volunteer could sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense on the same terms, and all the payments due became tax-exempt, while the mercenary himself was entitled for credit holidays48 and a number of other benefits.
45 — “Mery podderžki učastnikov SVO i členov ih semej” [Support measures for participants of SVO and their family members], Website of the Kaliningrad Oblast Government, October 5, 2022, available at: https://social.gov39.ru.
46 — “Edinovremennaâ denežnaâ vyplata” [One-time cash payment], Official website of the Russian Government, November 2022, available at: http://government.ru.
47 — “Pomoŝ’ učastnikam SVO i ih blizkim: komu i kakie l’goty položeny” [Assistance to participants and their relatives: who and what benefits are available to them], TASS, March 14, 2023, available at: https://tass.ru.
48 — “Mery podderžki mobilizovannyh i učastnikov SVO” [Support measures for mobilized persons and participants in SWE], Central Bank of Russia, available at: https://cbr.ru.
These new measures changed the Russian army’s formation principles almost completely by the end of the first year of the war. The monthly wage fund for the military had skyrocketed from 31–33 billion rubles up to nearly 200 billion rubles, but this was only the beginning. The stock of “volunteer” prisoners quickly became exhausted (the number of male inmates in Russia had declined by more than 35% in one year49, and nearly 90 detention facilities had been closed50), and, even in poor regions, people were reluctant to enlist. The Kremlin, relying heavily on financial instruments and fearing resentment over a prospective new wave of mobilization, recommended that regional authorities stimulate recruitment further. This resulted in the introduction of a series of local bonuses and awards for signing contracts, which subsequently fueled fierce competition between regions for the highest payouts. While at the end of 2022 these enlisting bonuses amounted to between 50,000 and 100,000 rubles in most Russian regions, by the spring of 2023 the “champions” were already offering more than the federal authorities; in August, a record 500,000 rubles promised for signing a contract in St Petersburg51 put this city in top position. However, 2024 became the year of records: in April, 1 million rubles were offered as an enlisting bonus by the government of the Krasnodar Krai52 and, by winter, in Samara Oblast, the figure hit almost 4 million rubles53 (equivalent to the average salary in this region for 4.5 years). During 2024, according to calculations by colleagues from Re:Russia, the average military recruitment bonus tripled (and, in several regions that joined the race somewhat late, it increased even by 20 times).54 The federal bonus was also elevated to 400,000 rubles at the end of July 202455.
49 — “Tûremnoe naselenie prodolžaet isčezat’” [The prison population continues to disappear], Website of the Federal Chamber of Lawyers of the Russian Federation, February 27, 2025, available at: https://fparf.ru.
50 — A. Danilina, “V Rossii za 3,5 goda zakryli počti 90 kolonij i SIZO. Èto iz-za vojny?” [Russia has closed almost 90 colonies and pre-trial detention centers in 3.5 years. Is this because of the war?], iStories, July 8, 2025, available at: https://istories.media.
51-52 — “Regiony uveličili razmer edinovremennoj vyplaty za zaklûčenie kontrakta s Minooborony RF do 2 mln rublej” [Regions increased the amount of a lump-sum payment for concluding a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense to 2 million rubles], Krasnaâ liniâ, August 15, 2024, available at: www.rline.tv.
53 — “Do 4 mln rublej uveličili vyplatu za kontrakt s Minoborony v Samarskoj oblasti” [Payment for a contract with the Ministry of Defense in the Samara region has been increased to 4 million rubles], The Insider, January 3, 2025, available at: https://theins.ru.
54 — “Osobennosti gibridnoj mobilizacii: kommerčeskij kontrakt stal ne tol’ko glavnym sposobom popolneniâ fronta živoj siloj, no i instrumentom social’noj stabilizacii v usloviâh vojny” [Features of hybrid mobilization: the commercial contract became not only the main way to replenish the front with manpower, but also an instrument of social stabilization in war conditions], Re:Russia, November 19, 2024, available at: https://rerussia.net.
55 — “Podpisan ukaz o vyplate 400 tysâč rublej za zaklûčenie kontrakta o službe v zone SVO” [A decree on payment of 400,000 rubles for concluding a contract on service in the SVO zone has been signed], Interfax, July 31, 2024, available at: www.interfax.ru.
As a result, the authorities agreed to pay not so much for a prospective soldier’s willingness to fight, but rather for his life as such; the initial payment of 2–3 million rubles exceeded the potential annual earnings at the frontline, while few managed to survive that long on the battlefield.
However, of course, the death gratuity remained of paramount importance for both servicemen and their relatives (as will be discussed below). By the end of summer 2024, the “presidential” bonus, insurance benefits and regional compensations had elevated the average gratuity to 15.2 million rubles, not counting subsequent monthly payments to the families of the dead56 (as a result, by early 2025 the combined death payments became almost equal to the entire ordinary salaries fund administered by the Ministry of Defense). This “innovative” approach has changed not only the attitude of citizens to the possibility of participating in the war, but has also removed the issue of the ethnic composition of the army fighting in Ukraine. Whereas in 2022 it was common to say that the force was almost half made up of representatives of ethnic minorities57 (reflecting the authorities’ effort to mobilize a disproportionate number of residents of national republics—Bashkortostan, Mari El, Tyva, Buryatia, and others58), the shift to voluntary mercenary recruitment has led to a significant increase in participants from “ethnically Russian” regions. This is borne out by the latest casualty statistics, in which Tuva, Buryatia and Altai Krai now lag far behind Sverdlovsk, Perm and Moscow oblasts, as well as Krasnodar Krai59.
56 — A. Gostisheva, “Vyplaty za gibel’ na SVO v 2025 godu: polnyj spisok” [Payments for deaths in SWO in 2025: full list], Vyberu.ru, August 11, 2025, available at: www.vbr.ru.
57 — “V Rossii otpravlâût voevat’ bol’še nacmen’šinstv, čtoby ne mobilizovat’ ètničeskih rossiân” [Russia sends more ethnic minorities to fight in order not to mobilize ethnic Russians], Zmina, July 19, 2022, available at: https:// zmina.info.
58 — “Mobilizaciâ men’šinstv?” [Mobilization of minorities?], Idel.Realii, September 30, 2022, available at: www.idelreal.org.
59 — “Poteri Rossii v vojne s Ukrainoj” [Russia’s casualties in the war with Ukraine], Mediazona, January 16, 2026, available at: https://zona.media.
Therefore, already by early 2024, deathonomics had become an essential element of Russia’s socio-political realm. Its primary function was to promote voluntary recruitment into the armed forces, thereby eliminating the need for further forced mobilization (the fact that it became no longer needed appeared obvious already in 202360 even though the Russian liberal media frequently disseminated information on the “inevitability” of another mobilization attempt).61 It fit perfectly into the country’s governance system, as recruitment became a new metric for measuring a governor’s performance—and poor, undeveloped regions were given an excellent opportunity to stand out by meeting their quotas. A whole new business arose around recruiting; within months, police officers, social workers, bailiffs and local officials were securing contracts through persuasion and deception—pressuring and fooling people while receiving their own rewards for each “submitted” person62. Pay fluctuations demonstrated the extreme flexibility of the “market”; the number of recruits grew proportionally to the increase in bonuses, those willing to enlist moved to regions where the pay was highest63, and many of those who had not intended to serve expressed their willingness to do so if the proposed bonuses and salaries were doubled, on average64. According to official statistics, approximately 540,000 people signed military contracts in Russia in 2023, and nearly 450,000 in 202465 (alternative estimates for each of those years were slightly lower, by 100,000 to 120,00066). Thus, although deathonomics emerged as a result of spontaneous decisions made in panic and hurry, it has become an effective instrument of the Russian regime’s military and social policy.
60 — V. Inozemtsev, “Ždet li Rossiû novaâ mobilizaciâ?” [Is a new mobilization awaiting Russia?], Riddle, April 11, 2024, available at: https://ridl.io/ru.
61 — “‘Možem obʺâsnit’: v ânvare načnetsâ očerednaâ volna mobilizacii v regionah” [“We can explain”: Another wave of mobilization in the regions will begin in January], The Insider, December 2, 2022, available at: https://theins.ru; “‘Sil nedostatočno’. Voennye trebuût ot Putina ob”âvit’ novuû mobilizaciû” [“The forces are not enough”. Military demands Putin announce new mobilization], The Moscow Times, September 19, 2024, available at: https://ru.themoscowtimes.com.
62 — A. Ryzhkova, “‘Privedi druga’, ili kak rossiâne zarabatyvaût, otpravlââ drug druga na vojnu” [“Bring a friend,” or how Russians make money by sending each other to war], Verstka, June 11, 2025, available at: https://verstka.media.
63 — M. Blant, “Tri milliona za kontrakt. K čemu privedet regional’naâ gonka vyplat” [Three million per contract. What will the regional race for payments lead to?], Radio Svoboda, October 8, 2024, www.svoboda.org.
64 — D. Gudkov and D. Nekrasov, “The Price of Life. A Study of Russians’ Willingness to Fight for Money”, CASE Center, December 2024, available at: https://case-center.org.
65 — “Šojgu: v 2023 godu na službu po kontraktu postupili 540 tys. čelovek” [Shoigu: in 2023, 540 thousand people entered the contract service], Kommersant, February 20, 2024, available at: www.kommersant.ru; “Medvedev raskryl čislo zaklûčivših kontrakt v 2024 godu” [Medvedev disclosed the number of contractors in 2024], RBK, January 24, 2025, available at: www.rbc.ru.
66 — O. Loginov, “RF spravlâetsâ s naborom kontraktnikov na vojnu v Ukraine?” [RF coping with recruitment of contract workers for the war in Ukraine?], Deutsche Welle, June 18, 2025, available at: www.dw.com.
However, the most surprising part in this entire story was the Russian army’s failure to respond in a coherent manner to the transition from conscription to mercenary service, and to the growth of its financial burden. Commanders showed no increased concern for their soldiers—and the situation remained unchanged even when experienced economist Andrey Belousov replaced staunch soldafone Sergei Shoigu as Russia’s Minister of Defense. “Meat assaults”, in which hundreds of servicemen were wasted in a single day, continued67, and violence against rank-and-file personnel became more unbridled68, yet the military could boast of no significant successes. From the beginning of 2024 to the end of 2025, Russian troops captured 6,200 square kilometers, or approximately 1% of Ukraine’s territory, paying for each square kilometer with up to a hundred killed and wounded69. Some analysts stated that, at this rate, it would take the Russian army more than a century to completely occupy the entire territory of Ukrainian70. Of course, one could attribute these “difficulties” to the effective support provided by Ukraine’s Western allies as well as to the heroism of Ukrainian fighters defending their homeland, but it would be equally reasonable to assume that the mercenary army failed to live up to the enormous expectations placed on it. Even by inflating the cost of manpower to unprecedented levels, deathonomics has not made the Russian military much more effective. This is its most serious shortcoming. But, if the significance of Putin’s invention is not reduced to its military aspects alone, it is clear that, in both economic and socio-political terms, deathonomics has played a big role in consolidating the regime’s support and contributing to the decline of protest all across the country.
67 — M. Krutov, “‘Taktik mâsnyh šturmov’. Čto govorât o generale Mordvičeve” [“Tactician of Meatstorms”. What they say about General Mordvichev], Radio Svoboda, May 16, 2025, available at: www.svoboda.org.
68 — I. Zhadaev et al, “‘Im pohuj, kogo obnulât’’. Kak kaznât v rossijskoj armii” [“They don’t give a fuck who they zero in on”. How executions are carried out in the Russian army], Verstka, October 28, 2025, available at: https://verstka.media.
69 — “Nakanune ‘rešaûŝego proryva’: Rossiâ gotovitsâ k masštabnomu nastupleniû, čej ishod nadolgo opredelit traektoriû konflikta i scenarij ego zaveršeniâ” [On the eve of a “decisive breakthrough”: Russia is preparing for a major offensive, the outcome of which will determine the trajectory of the conflict and its end scenario for a long time to come], Re:Russia, September 16, 2025, available at: https://re-russia.net.
70 — D. Axe, “At The Current Rate, It Would Take Russia Centuries And Tens Of Millions Of Casualties To Capture Ukraine”, Forbes, May 1, 2025, available at: www.forbes.com.