Introduction

Introduction
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Three years in, the Russo–Ukrainian war has taken a heavy toll on both sides. According to a moderate estimate, close to 250,000 combatants have been killed. The total casualty count, including fatalities and disabilities among both the military and civilians, may be in excess of 1 million. On top of the catastrophic loss of life and large-scale destruction, the war has involved a massive deployment of resources on the part of Ukraine and a broad international coalition of allies. Over the course of three years, these countries have spent a total of, at least, $400 billion repelling Russia’s aggression, of which close to $360 billion has been provided by the allies. In an unprecedented bid to halt the Putin regime economically, Western governments have sanctioned Russia’s financial and trade capabilities, which have, among other things, blocked the exports of Russian coal, crude oil, and oil products. Furthermore, in early 2025, Ukraine’s new policy thwarted the supply of Russian natural gas, which led to mounting expenses on the part of European governments. These new costs are estimated at $800 billion. The invasion has resulted in more than 4.2 million Ukrainians fleeing the country as refugees, only to be admitted—ever so generously—by the E.U. nations. But with each passing year of continued warfare, the odds of these people coming back home are shrinking. Indeed, between 35% and 65% of them have been adamant about staying in the E.U. for a longer term and obtaining a new citizenship.

Seeing as the current aid is not nearly enough to give Ukraine a strategic edge, a prolonged war effort could see Ukraine face the irreversible damage. Meanwhile, most Western governments are reluctant to repivot their economies around the defense and wartime priorities that would have them directly confront Moscow. The first steps taken by the new U.S. administration strongly suggest that President Donald Trump is seeking to bring about a truce as soon as possible, as he is on a mission to go down as a great pacifier. He also believes that continued hostilities will lead to an ethical and financial disaster. It is too early to say whether the White House will be able to negotiate a deal with the Kremlin and, importantly, whether Ukraine will agree to the terms proposed. However, even if an upcoming deal is on the cards, the Russian president’s willingness to hold up his end of the bargain appears to be questionable. Worse still, any deal that would involve territorial concessions granted to Russia would be dismissed by most Ukrainian voters.

Thus, a truce is unlikely to put an end to the conflict, and the hostilities may well be reignited. Given this plight, the West will be faced with, at least, three tasks that are strikingly similar to the ones it successfully brought to fruition during the Cold War.

Firstly, it will be incumbent on the West to forestall a potential flareup that would entail a full-out military response and heighten the odds of a global nuclear conflict. As the Cold War history suggests, even the most irreconcilable of beefs are not necessarily conducive to a hot world war, whereas minor contradictions counterintuitively led countries to slip into the global carnage.

Secondly, the West should be able to prudently leverage the new economic reality and a slew of new opportunities to put its adversary on the economic back foot the way it did in the Cold War era.

Thirdly, it should prevent the spread of authoritarian orthodoxies among the Global South and impede the sprawling global community spearheaded by China and Russia.

This outlook suggests that global “post-historic” society is not emerging in the foreseeable future. Apparently, the West has fundamentally misjudged the future trajectories of both Russia and China. The Wandel durch Handel policy will not work. Neither Russia’s nor China’s newly found market orientation, as well as the adoption of Western consumption practices, has turned these countries into Western-style democracies.

This will be a painfully sobering realization, for dozens of leading experts, let alone politicians and large businesses, have built a career and made fortunes advocating the opposite concept, whether in theory or in practice. Nevertheless, we are arguing for a large-scale shift in the West’s strategic stance on Putin’s Russia and, most likely, some other countries, too, the ones that could jeopardize modern democracies.