The New Containment strategy that we argue Western governments could deploy is somewhat similar to the Cold War one. Crucially, it cannot be identical because both the present-day Russia and China are different from the Soviet Union in a number of important ways, which will be addressed below as we list the proposed measures.
The first step will be to ramp up the West’s military and technological capabilities and ensure its strategic unity. This is essential to tackling all sorts of modern security threats. Its particular importance with regards to Russia is punctuated by the Russian elite having to rise to various technological challenges in the defense sector.
The 1970s arms race precipitated the crash of the Soviet economic model, even though it was not the biggest reason behind that collapse. Being a market economy, today’s Russia is managing the soaring war costs without compromising the public sector needs. But this is not something that could be handled and balanced indefinitely. In 2025, Russia’s military expenses are set at 7.5% to 8% of GDP. Should the West embrace a long-term containment strategy, the Kremlin will have no option to keep up with this rate regardless of a potential truce. This will be also prompted by an oversized military and the defense contractors that will take years to make up for the equipment lost in combat. Besides, it will be vital to the technological progress, as Russia has not exactly been producing a lot of state-of-the-art weapon systems.
It is, however, worth noting that, unlike the Soviet Union, Russia does not boast a self-sufficient military-industrial complex, for it is heavily dependent on foreign-made component imports. The same is true of the manufacturing equipment. Severely impeded maintenance and repair opportunities will inevitably cause its deterioration. Finally, in several subsectors of the defense industry, including aerospace technology, Russia has long wasted the Soviet know-how and is unlikely to be able to compete with the West, should the latter reconsider its defense manufacturing policy. From what we know, so far, Russia has succeeded in stepping up its output of unsophisticated technologies like shells, battle tanks, and massproduced UAVs. But the odds are that it will be unable to catch up with the West in terms of producing advanced fighter jets, missile defense systems, and other military developments.
Notably, over the past few decades, Western governments have made significant cuts to their defense R&D budgets compared with their Cold War-era spending. In 2024, the NATO member states’ defense expenditures averaged 2.71% of their respective GDPs. Starting in 2014, the real defense costs have been rising at an average annual rate of 2%. By contrast, in 1983, the defense-related share of their GDPs amounted to 5.3%. For the U.S., that share dropped from 6.6% to 3.36%.
Capital Outflow from Russia by Year, in Billions of Dollars, 2008–2024
But there is a lot of potential to step up the production, which will, in turn, spur economic growth. This new robust militarization trend was set by President Donald Trump as he insisted the NATO countries increase their defense budgets to reach 5% of their GDPs. It should be emphasized that a surge in military spending is capable of boosting economic growth and technological progress, as was the case under the Ronald Reagan administration. But unlike in the Cold War era, these days, the West should not just be manufacturing more battle tanks and fighter jets, but also investing more in high-tech areas to counteract cyberattacks, data security breaches, and attempted damage to the infrastructure. It means these higher costs will, too, be beneficial to non-military industries. History suggests that increased defense budgets that are not caused by domestic hostilities bolster an economic growth spurt. It was evidenced by the U.S. strategy between 1914 and 1917 as well as between 1939 and 1941.
Outflow of People (Emigration) from Russia by Year, in Thousands, 2008–2024
The second aspect of the New Containment strategy should draw upon the Cold War expertise when it comes to a competition in the standard of living and economic development. Most elements are the same as the ones we witnessed being deployed during the Cold War, ranging from restrictions to the transfer of certain products and technologies to ambitious high-stakes space exploration projects and competitive propaganda narratives. These are the well-known facts that need not be reiterated.
But a significant tweak to this aspect will be creating the conditions to bleed Russia and other countries opposing the Western world dry of their financial and human capital. An attempt to thwart this process only helps to improve these regimes’ economic and intellectual prowess. On the other hand, there were multiple examples where the outflow of financial assets and talent put a strain on the national economy, as was the case in the 1990s Russia, the 1960s Cuba, the 1980s Iran, and etc.
Equally pressing is the hindered outflow of human capital, a problem we have repeatedly brought up. The Soviet Union famously pursued an isolationist policy where foreign travel opportunities were extremely limited and emigration was, by and large, outlawed. It enabled the communist government to take advantage of elite-level scientific potential and offer high-quality university programs in science, tech design, and engineering, which helped them remain on par with the free world in terms of the military technologies, aircraft industry, and space research. Ever since the Soviet Union fell, thousands of scientists, tech experts, engineers, medical professionals, and artists have left Russia. By 2014, the research potential of the Russian émigrés had topped that of the domestic capabilities, while star musicians and stage actors hailing from the former Soviet republics have joined the world-famous Western-based orchestras and theater companies2.
2 — See Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “Russkiy Mir vs Russkiy Mir” in: Sociological Studies, 2015, no. 5, pp. 150 – 155.
It was not until the mid-2000s that Russia began to see a slow rebuild of its human capital, but it all changed with the outbreak of the Ukraine war. Following February 24, 2022, at least 1 million people have escaped Russia, most of them well-educated, resourceful, liberal-leaning, and pro-European individuals in their prime3. This mass exodus has caused significant damaged to the Russian economy, which was universally acknowledged by all of the rational officials, including Elvira Nabiullina who cited personnel shortages as Russia’s worst economic problem. However, most of the exiles never made it to Europe or legalized their stay there. As a result, a lot of them wound up in the post-Soviet countries that did not offer them enough comfort and job opportunities. Subsequently, many had to return to Russia. Worse still, the number of returning individuals has been on the rise.
3 — For more details, see Gudkov, Dmitry; Inozemtsev, Vladislav and Nekrasov, Dmitry. The New Russian Diaspora Europe’s Challenge and Opportunity / Russie.Eurasie.Reports, No. 47, Paris: Ifri, June 2024.
We opine that successful strategic containment of Russia, China, and suchlike suggests that Europe and the U.S. relax the admission requirements for high-skilled professionals, businesspeople, and even bureaucrats. A case in point: while between 1953 and 1990, at least 1,200 Soviet officials, intelligence operatives, and military personnel fled the country, in recent years, the Russian elites have been forced to rally behind the current government. Moreover, it would be a huge mistake to refuse to influence those of the Russian elites that are likely to cooperate with the West and to sow division among these elites4.
4 — A co-author of this paper commented on the issue. See Inosemzew, Wladislaw. “Ein neues Russland-Strategie für den Westen” in: Internationale Politik, 2023, № 6 (November-Dezember), SS. 94–99.
Our premise is that there is no way anyone can compete with Western nations without being able to leverage the expertise of those who are in the know of, or associated with, the West’s best practices. Losing Westernized individuals would deliver a catastrophic blow to any government. Besides, welcoming talented and competent Russians abroad could serve to divide the Russian elites, which is vital to a leadership change. In other words, while Soviet isolationism led to an economic decline, with multiple bubbles failing to escape the tightly shut lid, Russia’s current open-door policy should be taken advantage of to facilitate similar effects. Sure enough, it cannot be ruled out that the Kremlin may counter it by sealing the borders, but that move would only exacerbate social and political tensions.
The third element of the upgraded containment doctrine, as we see it, is the West’s more consistent policy toward the countries that are not developed economies while also not being associated with China and Russia.
Back in the Cold War era, countries that could potentially be imperiled by the Eastern Bloc enjoyed the support from the West, even if their policies fell short of the Western democratic and human rights standards. Some neutral countries maintained their status as most favored nations while refraining from picking a side. Today, though, the nations that have civilizationally sided with the West cannot feel entirely safe, whereas many governments that fail to completely live up to democratic standards have been slapped with sanctions or denied international help see no other option but to build ties to China, Russia, or Iran.
This approach proves inefficient when it comes to countering the expansion of Russia and China’s spheres of influence. Some even talk of the “Russian belt” that is cutting Africa in half as the Kremlin steps up its military presence there. An important difference from the Cold War strategy is the West’s willingness to scrap its presence in these countries. The most recent examples include Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, and other African nations.
We are advocating the revival of the previous-era principles whereby one cannot be Russia’s ally while fostering economic relations with the West. The latter should be effectively bargaining for such nations. Just as was the case during the Cold War, these relations should be dominated by the overarching geopolitical goals and rationale. For example, the West could lift the sanctions in exchange for the government’s refusal to interact with Beijing and Moscow. It could “reset” its relations with Syria, should its government mandate the shutdown of the Russian military bases, etc.
One of the key factors that facilitated the outcome of the Cold War was a markedly higher standard of living in Western-oriented countries. In this regard, the future of Ukraine’s political system and national economy could be used to show the perks of the country’s civilizational choice to the rest of the post-Soviet nations. And while ensuring the kind of chasm that existed between the standard of living in West and East Germany appears to be a bold and iffy expectation, one thing is clear. Maintaining things the way they are, with Ukraine being economically inferior to some other postSoviet nations, as it was before the war, and its democratic institutions being degraded, would be a generous gift to Vladimir Putin. It would also be conducive to a further expansion of the autocratic sphere of influence. The economic and institutional support of the post-war Ukraine and the nations that find themselves in similar plight is perfectly aligned with the values and practical interests of the Western coalition.
There are two main reasons this policy is particularly important these days. On the one hand, it can help the West turn the chapter that has to do with its colonial past. By ramping up the Global South aid and encouraging equitable economic partnerships while prioritizing the needs of the local residents, the West could be a seen as a far better choice than Russia and China fostering corruption, autocracy, and the resource grab. As we all know, China is now turning into the largest investor and trade partner for the African nations5. On the other hand, by furthering such relations, the West will be ensured a priority access to the resources that would otherwise end up controlled by its strategic opponents.
5 — See Murphy, Dawn. China’s Rise in the Global South: The Middle East, Africa, and Beijing’s Alternative World Order, Stanford (Ca.): Stanford Univ. Press, 2024, pp. 11–17.
By honing its policy toward the Global South, the West should bear in mind that many of these nations (e.g., most of the BRICS countries like India, Brazil, South Africa, the UAE, etc.) are not striving to either be lorded over by China and Russia or feud with the West if it is going to damage their interests. Therefore, the inevitable confrontation with Moscow and Beijing can be accompanied by a rekindled Non-Aligned Movement that, during the Cold War, spanned countries that refused to side politically with either of the rival blocs.
Our conviction is that President George W. Bush’s formula, “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” can never be the basis of a complex and nuanced containment architecture. Far from it, it would be pushing many “decent states” toward the revisionist governments. Moreover, it is worth attempting, more than ever before, to overhaul the system of international institutions that was created in the wake of World War II. It is this system that helps the Kremlin single-handedly block the consensusbased opinions of the global community targeting its aggression. In March 2022, on top of Russia itself, only four U.N. member states voted against condemning the Kremlin’s invasion, but the Security Council’s veto power prevented any mandatory resolutions from being adopted. It may be high time we set up new international organizations, seeing as the current ones fail to ensure peaceful coexistence of more than 200 nations.
In summary, let us recapitulate our case for the adoption of the New Containment strategy that would be fruitful and efficient.
The amount of aid Ukraine is getting now prevents it from winning the war militarily, while Western government lack the unity and resolve to ensure the Kremlin’s military defeat.
Just like its Cold War antecedent, the updated containment strategy envisions two goals: avoiding an escalation and biding the time that will foil the Putin regime in the longer term. The technological gap is growing, and a future energy transition will depreciate Putin’s resource and sow dissatisfaction among the Russians.
An important factor suggesting a new Cold War will be shorter than the previous one is the very nature of Russia’s personalist regime. Unlike the Soviet Union with a fairly transparent mechanism behind the transfer of power predicated on the Communist Party structure, the governance in modern Russia boils down to a one-man rule, and this individual may be seeking to stay at the helm for the rest of his life. This configuration will strip any potential successor of the special status and the clout exercised by Vladimir Putin.
It is highly likely that Putin’s system is not replicable just as most of the 20th-century personalist dictatorships. They were either undermined by the wars they had started, or toppled in the wake of the economic and political crises, or degraded following the founders’ deaths. In 2015, a coauthor of this paper argued that the West’s policy should have focused on surviving the Putin regime while limiting the damage6. The temporal horizon for this strategy looks rather short, and should it be implemented, the West can easily afford it.
6 — See Inosemzew, Wladislaw. “Russia of 2010s: How to Live with It and how to Outlive It” DGAP Kompakt 07/2015, Berlin, DGAP: June 2015, pp. 1–9.