The main features of the current Russian relocation allow us to expand and refine the propositions that we expressed in our article a year and a half ago.
We believe that EU member states countries should treat Russian relocants as, on the one hand, an important economic and social resource for European societies; and, on the other hand, as an effective tool for weakening an aggressive Russia, more in terms of economics than politics. Both of these factors highlight the desirability of integrating Russian migrants into European societies rather than rejecting or sidelining them.
Within this approach, it seems logical to soften the requirements that Russian relocants are facing for obtaining documents allowing them to permanently reside in the EU. In our view, the main objective of such a move is to encourage relocation to Europe by Russians with the knowledge and skills necessary for running their own businesses or working in high-skilled positions. This should not imply (as often happens) that people must secure employment in advance; a kind of “probationary period” could be secured during which the capabilities of relocants can be assessed. In other words, those who left Russia after the start of the war in Ukraine and are now staying outside the EU could be given priority opportunities to obtain a yearly resident card upon confirming their knowledge of one of the main European languages, a higher-education certificate, work experience in their field, and entrepreneurial activity, along with confirmation that they have a certain amount of funds considered sufficient for living in the country of residence (evidence of real estate or liquid assets in Russia owned by them could serve as an analog). At the same time, the main conditions for the renewal of residency documents should be, on the one hand, employment or creation of some functioning business, as well as confirmation of any income-generating activity that does not require the host country to provide the relocants with social benefits; and, on the other hand, proof of staying more than 3/4 of the time in the country issuing the residence permit, as well as a valid contract for the purchase or lease of housing there. Such measures could affect Russians who have already left Russia and do not wish to return: by the most modest estimates, within several months, no fewer than 300,000 applications could be submitted, which would serve as a signal to many of those remaining in Russia. European embassies in Moscow could shift their focus from issuing visas to accepting applications for longer stays; this would reduce the chances of unwanted Russians entering, as visa issuance remains quite extensive, and candidate checks are not stringent enough.
The same approaches should be extended to the Russians who are already in the EU, using previously issued visas; if they can demonstrate sufficient financial resources for living in Europe, disclose sources of income, and waive social benefits, as well as commit to staying in the issuing country for more than 3/4 of the visa’s duration, they could also obtain residency rights. Of course, holders of such documents should not encounter the usual difficulties faced by today’s relocants when opening bank accounts, renting property, finding employment, etc. Essentially, it is proposed that a broad program of “economic migration” from Russia should be developed.
What can such a program achieve? In our view, quite a lot.
First of all, it would provide European countries, especially those with slow economic growth, with additional financial and labor resources. It is unlikely that a large number of relocants would find jobs in European countries immediately, which means they would need to bring in no less than €20,000 to €35,000 annually from abroad, thus bringing tens of billions of euros to Europe. (The authorities can set ceilings on both the balances of relocants’ accounts and their transactions to protect against money laundering and only allow rental or property purchases with the involvement of notaries who could control the targeted use of funds transferred for these purposes). Several hundred thousand Russians with an inclination for entrepreneurship (which we noted earlier) could provide an additional boost to European economies – not as massive as observed in post-Soviet countries, but still considerable.
Furthermore, Europeans would gain a unique kind of diaspora, who, while remaining loyal to the society of their homeland, would have no reverence for its authorities (one can easily imagine the attitude of those fleeing dictatorship towards Vladimir Putin’s call to “integrate but not assimilate” in Europe; we believe it would differ greatly from the reaction to a similar call directed at Turks living in Germany, recently voiced by Recep Tayyip Erdogan), or towards any “traditional” institutions (the vast majority of the relocants do not support the social and political “doctrine” of the Russian Orthodox Church), making it an exception to most other ethnic diasporas. Facing representatives of previous waves of Russian emigration, many of whom today hail the Kremlin’s nationalist policies, the relocants would become ambassadors of European values in Russian-speaking circles, and they themselves would integrate into host societies much faster than their predecessors.
Finally, in the longer term, the integration of new Russian relocants and their transformation into a new wave of emigration could disrupt the unity between Russia and the Russians, which has formed in the European consciousness over the past thirty years, when Europe received a “copy” of Russian society each time: in the early 1990s, relatively poor but educated individuals fleeing the crisis in their country, and, in the 2000s and partly in the 2010s, those who got wealthy during the Putin boom and corresponded to the image of a prosperous Russia, “obeying some rules”. If the relocants are accepted, Europeans have a chance to see behind the facade of the new dictatorship to recognize that there is a Russia of people who know how to do business, who are well educated, have a broad outlook, and share liberal values – not in the contemporary leftist guise, but in that classical understanding, which is gradually being forgotten in modern Western societies. These people would become a living reminder for several decades that Russia and Putin are different entities and that, in fighting Putin, there is no need to alienate Russia and its people because of the deeds of their ruler.
Here we arrive at the second topic, no less important than the first.
For several decades, Western politicians – explicitly or implicitly – have had two prejudices about Russia and its positioning vis-à-vis the West. The first was based on the principle of “Wandel durch Handel”: change through trade and the development of economic ties, which has been one of the basic foundations of German foreign policy towards Russia since the Soviet era. This approach is now probably practically dead; even Daniel Treisman, a progressive economist who some time ago insisted that “Russia is a normal country” has switched to condemning Vladimir Putin as a “spin dictator” 19. The second prejudice assessed everything coming from Russia as a kind of “absolute evil”, talking up the export of dirty money and corruption from the country, insisting that the rule of law would not prevail in Russia as long as Russian oligarchs settled disputes among themselves in the High Court of London, and pointing to bribe-takers comfortably spending the rest of their lives on the Côte d’Azur 20. This dogma is also going out of fashion as Europeans realize that repatriating Russian money back from Europe to Russia only helps Vladimir Putin keep the economy afloat and gives him a chance to wage war in Ukraine almost indefinitely. Therefore, today the strategy to undermine the Putin regime should include orchestrated “bleeding”: stimulating the outflow of qualified specialists and money from Russia, unrelated to the war, of Russian business.
To finalize our research, it is worth addressing a question often raised by experts and politicians: How important is it to preserve and support the Russian diaspora as a factor in the potential future political transformation of Russia?
To our mind, this task cannot be the main one shaping the European strategy regarding the Russian relocants, and for several reasons. First, as we have already noted, political emigrants constitute a tiny minority in the emerging Russian diaspora (unlike, for example, in the 1920s). Secondly, most expatriates left Russia not having lost some round of political struggle but consciously preferring not to get involved in it. Thirdly, as discussions among Russian expatriates themselves show, many consider regime change from within to be more likely than from outside. The Russian diaspora, if the regime collapses, could rather become a source of people involved in the global economy and understanding the basics of how democratic institutions function, being able to form the backbone of a new public service. (This community is unlikely to provide Russia with new revolutionaries, as the Russian emigration of the late 19th and early 20th centuries did.)
Summing up, we would like to reiterate: With the onset of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the irreversible transformation of Putin’s regime into a dictatorship, the Western world may get a unique opportunity to weaken its geopolitical adversary as well as to secure substantial economic benefits by welcoming Russian relocants and their capital. For quite a long time, the Russian diaspora in Europe has been shaped by the people who moved to the West primarily to secure their own comfort or to establish “reserve headquarters” for their families and money, but who were not inclined to integrate into their new societies and preferred to continue conducting business in or close to Russia. The current wave of newcomers, on the contrary, consists mainly of those who may be called “Russian Europeans”, who have realized that their paths have diverged from Putin’s Russia and who can and want to integrate into European societies, work for their prosperity, endorse European values, and, in the end, become Russian Europeans, without any quotation marks.
The more numerous they are, in our view, the better it will be for both Europe and, ultimately, Russia, as this people will become instrumental in a future reconciliation between Europe and Russia, without which any hopes for peace in this century appear entirely illusory.