A study conducted by the University of Nicosia on behalf of CASE differs from most other contemporary surveys of Russian relocants because it probably pioneers the insights into the diasporas that have emerged in “old” Europe – in Germany and France; in “new” Europe – e.g., Poland; and in Cyprus, which has long been one of the noticeable destination countries for Russians located outside the former USSR. It also allows for a comparison of attitudes and objective conditions of those who left Russia before 2013, between 2014 and 2021, and in 2022 and later, both overall and for each of these countries.
In general, it should be acknowledged that both the sentiments and status of the Russians who left their homeland after 2014 share significant similarities across most European countries included in our sample (we presumed, for example, that the differences between Poland and Germany would be much greater). In all of these countries, the relocants primarily identify themselves as “ethnic Russians” or “Russians” (taken together, these responses are twice as common as identification as “residents of the host country”), even though 93% of respondents have temporary or permanent residence permits or even dual citizenship. Everywhere, they are loyal to the values and laws of the local societies, make efforts to integrate, and strive to earn a living in the host countries (overall, only 9% of respondents in the sample claim that their main income comes from Russia, and about 10% give an indefinite answer or refuse to comment). However, there are some differences, with France and Cyprus being at opposite poles 14.
14 — Survey of Russian emigrants in European countries (Germany, France, Cyprus, Poland), op. cit.
The differences between these cases cannot be deemed fundamental, but they provide some food for thought. Some are both easily explainable (for example, among those driven by the desire to preserve their gender identity, relocation to free and secular France is 2.5 times more common than to conservative and Orthodox Cyprus) and understandable (for example, France has the highest material inequality among relocants, with a record number of Russians with incomes below €3,000 per month and above €10,000 per month (this means, probably, that both those who intend to live on social welfare and those who have no financial problems choose France), while in Cyprus, the proportion of those earning between €3,000 and €7,000 per month is one and a half times higher than the average across all considered countries) 15. At the same time, there are differences that would not appear obvious and expected without detailed investigation.
15 — Ibid.
First and foremost, it’s worth noting that those who relocated to France are less likely than those in other countries to cite disagreement with Putin’s aggression against Ukraine or any other political reasons being the main motivation for leaving Russia (this proportion is more than a third lower than in Cyprus); instead, nearly three times as many respondents cited “personal reasons” as the basis for their move. The Russian diaspora in France appears to be the most tolerant towards the current situation in Russia; those who primarily identify themselves either as ethnic Russian or as Russian citizens are at least a third more numerous here than among those living in other EU countries. Nearly a fifth of the relocants adhere to the “typical” Russian attitude that both sides – Ukraine as well as Russia – are to blame in the current conflict; here, the largest proportion of the relocants “fully” or “partially” support Vladimir Putin’s policies (18% compared to 5% in Cyprus); accordingly, the smallest proportion condemn them (51% compared to Cyprus’s 77%). Unsurprisingly, in France, the difference in proportions between those who support Ukraine and those who remain on Russia’s side is relatively small – only 32% compared to 43% in Poland, 48% in Germany, and 56% in Cyprus. All of this contributes to a somewhat unexpectedly lukewarm attitude of current Russian relocants towards France as the host country: only 24% of those who moved there are unwilling to return to Russia, compared to an average figure of 36% across the other three countries surveyed 16.
16 — Ibid.
We won’t overburden our readers by continuing to compare individual country cases. However, our study does not address another important issue: the scale of Russian relocation. Today, hundreds of thousands of Russians live in many European countries without being their citizens, but in all of them, the share of these relocants does not exceed 1% of the total population. Only in Cyprus, which stands out among other European countries in many respects for the Russians who have moved there in recent years, are they much more noticeable in terms of both numbers and economic influence. The Cypriot local authorities are trying to adapt the island’s legislation to make their lives more comfortable; the taxes they pay contribute a hefty part of the country’s budget revenue, and their participation in the country’s economic and technological development is relatively significant.
Therefore, we want to go beyond the survey data and present the current situation with the Russian diaspora in Cyprus as a special case.