In terms of the social make-up, core self-identification, political views, and life aspirations, the Putin-era émigrés differ fundamentally from the majority of the Russian population. The relocation movement is largely made up of highly qualified, working-age individuals oriented toward European values—people who, in many ways, strive to be “more European than the Europeans themselves.”
Over the past three years, Russian relocation has not exhibited the typical features of a national diaspora—that is, a cohesive group capable of articulating and lobbying for its collective interests. For now, it represents a large but rather fragmented community of people who speak the same language but lack a shared agenda or common purpose.
The majority of immigrants observe a clear hierarchy of preferred migration destinations, determined primarily by their accessibility. At the top of this informal hierarchy are the barely accessible countries of Western Europe; next come the more accessible yet less desirable E.U. countries to the east and southeast; and finally, a range of “transit countries” sitting between Putin’s Russia and the developed world, which are seen as more or less acceptable temporary alternatives. Groups of immigrants based out of these different “value zones” differ markedly from one another in key respects, including their financial resources and social capital.
The E.U. countries (save for Cyprus) are deliberately complicating Russian immigration. Although they are, overall, beneficiaries of the process, they are deriving significantly fewer economic gains from it than they potentially could. The CIS countries, meanwhile, have failed to develop any coherent or consistent policy toward Russian émigrés and have either already lost or are likely soon to lose most of those who initially arrived. For these states, the effect has been a short-term economic benefit. The greatest advantage from the current plight has been gained by the economies of Cyprus, Serbia, and Georgia.
Emigration inflicts long-term cumulative damage on Putin’s Russia, which explains the regime being deeply concerned about it. Essentially, this is one of the most painful forms of the sanctions regime, a sanction Russia has imposed on itself.