Assessing the condition of Russian relocants two and a half years after the start of the war and the first wave of the dramatic exodus from Russia, one should pay attention, on one hand, to their subjective feelings, political preferences and self-identification and, on the other, to their economic situation, employment and positioning in host countries.
When it comes to their self-identification and self-perception, the Russians still – this has not changed much over time – define themselves as part of some Russian community (either as Russian relocants, as part of an entire Russian society, as belonging to some “future Russia”, or as part of their family who either remains in Russia or has already left it). More than 80% see their exit from Russia as a forced and temporary move, and more than 70% maintain regular contact with colleagues and relatives still living in Russia, obtaining most of their information from Russian or Russian-speaking media 12. However, when it comes to Russian relocants in Europe, as indicated by the results of the CASE research, only half of them express a desire to return to their home country; 11% say they will do this in any case, and 37% if “the situation has changed” (which may include various factors, from the absence of the danger of mobilization and the end of the war to the complete dismantling of Putin’s regime). Moreover, what seems equally important to us when asked if they would like to obtain citizenship in their new country of residence, up to 75% of relocants respond positively, which suggests a re-evaluation of their desire to return to Russia in the medium term (which highlights again that this applies only to EU countries, and suggests that the majority of returns to Russia in 2023-2024 originated from somewhere else – primarily from the post-Soviet countries) 13.
12 — E. Kamalov, “Poltora goda spustâ: progress i barʹery v integracii rossijskih èmigrantov” [One and a Half Years Later: Progress and Barriers in the Integration of Russian Emigrants], op. cit.13 — Survey of Russian emigrants in European countries (Germany, France, Cyprus, Poland), op. cit.
As far as their economic involvement and employment are concerned, some significant changes have occurred over recent years. At the time of their departure, just under half of the Russian relocants were employed by companies or organizations based in Russia, but gradually – due to actions undertaken by the Russian authorities and corporate leadership gradually limiting the possibility of remote work from abroad, receiving remuneration from Russia, and the emergence of new opportunities – this proportion decreased to 13% by mid-2023, and probably does not exceed 10% now. It should be noted, however, that Russian relocants – representing affluent segments of the country’s population – have provided significant amounts of money flowing into their new countries of residence. In Turkey alone, Russians purchased over 27,000 properties in 2022-2023 (they have been also active in the UAE, Israel, Indonesia, and Serbia). Additionally, currency inflows into destination countries are now observed not only from Russia; relocants are starting international businesses in many parts of the world, including high-tech companies. Finally, it should be noted that they are starting local companies in their new countries of residence or finding employment there.
This aspect of the lives and activities of relocants is of the greatest interest to us. The influx of Russians in 2022 altered the economic dynamics of many destination countries. In Armenia, where up to 110,000 Russians moved in 2022, the GDP growth rate reached 12.6% and 8.7% in 2022-2023, respectively; in Georgia 10.4% and 7.0%; in Kyrgyzstan 7.0% and 6.2% (to understand the significance of the Russian factor, one needs to consider that, in mid-2021, the World Bank forecasted GDP growth in these countries at 4.3%, 5.0%, and 3.3%, respectively). The arrival of the Russians caused these countries’ currencies to appreciate by between 11 and 23% against the US dollar and spurred a boom in housing construction and the services sector, where demands began to be made that the local population had rarely expressed previously. Seizing on these new trends, the authorities of several post-Soviet countries – for example, Armenia – began creating favorable conditions for relocants, hoping to retain them in the country and encouraging them to open local businesses. However, judging from the feedback from many Russians who found themselves in former Soviet republics, most of them do not perceive these countries as the final destination of their journeys.
Unlike the countries of the Russian “near-abroad”, most EU member states did not express enthusiasm about Russian emigration. In Europe, a debate emerged about banning Russians from purchasing real estate (as of the beginning of 2022, Russian citizens owned about 1 million apartments and houses in EU countries, the UK, and Switzerland, and the number of valid residence permits and visas at that time approached 2 million); numerous (sometimes informal) restrictions were imposed on opening bank accounts; processing payments from Russia and from Russian citizens residing in other countries was hindered; and opening and maintaining accounts in cryptocurrency also became problematic. As a result, the number of applications for long-term visas, residence permits and political asylum from Russians who want to regularize their status is increasing much faster than the number of satisfied petitions (in 2021, 82,900 residence permits were issued to Russian citizens in the EU, in 2022 more than 91,000, and in 2023, their number could increase by 20-30%) – but even at these rates, the process could take several more years, until (or if) all potentially interested parties finally reach the EU.