By most parameters, the current study clearly points to two poles—Serbia and the “other CIS countries” —while the data for Georgia is positioned midway between the two.
Serbia
As of late 2024, according to the Border Police Directorate and the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), Serbia had 110,000 Russian immigrants. Of these, 67,236 held residence permits, while a significant number were subject to the “visa run” regime, regularly traveling to neighboring Montenegro and returning to renew their temporary stay.
Eighty percent of the respondents in our study arrived in Serbia after September 2022. The country has the highest share (66%) of immigrants in their most productive age group— between 33 and 44—and a relatively small proportion of young people under 30. It also has the largest share of those who are married or have families at 73%. Likewise, Serbia posts the highest percentage (41%) of respondents stating that they would not return to Russia under any circumstances. In other countries of the transit zone, this figure is 31%, and among the E.U.-based immigrants, it is 28%.
In Serbia, the immigrants have noticeably higher incomes; up to one-third of them own a car, compared to just 9% in other countries covered by the study. At the same time, 62% of the Russian immigrants in Serbia have managed to retain material assets in Russia versus 49% in the CIS countries. In Serbia, 88% of the respondents have either full or incomplete college degrees. Only 8% of families have a monthly income below €1,000, whereas in other transit countries, that figure stands at 32%.
The scale of the “IT diaspora” is truly remarkable: nearly half of the Russian immigrants in Serbia are employed in this sector. In August 2024, Serbian minister without portfolio Nenad Popović reported that since the beginning of the war, Russian individuals and legal entities had founded a total of 2,128 businesses in the republic.
According to the Serbian Border Police Directorate and the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, as of late 2024, among roughly 110,000 Russian immigrants, 57.4% cited the war in Ukraine as their main reason for leaving. “Political reasons” ” ranked second (47%), and “economic reasons” third (42%). Our 2025 survey revealed the same general structure of priorities but with notable shifts in the figures: 81% of the respondents in Serbia named the Russian– Ukrainian conflict as their main reason for relocation, 62% cited other political reasons, and 26% mentioned economic reasons.
The survey data for Serbia is similar in many respects to the results obtained for Cyprus and represent an intermediate point between the samples from Germany and France, on the one hand, and those from the CIS countries, on the other.
CIS
The average survey results for Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan represent the opposite pole of Russian relocation. In these countries, the émigré population is the youngest and most male-dominated (men make up 65%, compared to the relocation average of 55%). Paradoxically, these same countries show the lowest share of those who have retained income sources in Russia—only 17%—and the highest share of those who have found employment in their host country at 57%. The gap between these figures and those for Serbia and Georgia amounts to several dozen percentage points.
In other words, it was mostly young men without professional connections, money, or clear future plans who fled to the CIS countries. The same destinations also manifest a relatively higher number of those intending or forced to return, along with a large share of respondents highly critical of Putin and his policies.
Immigrants in the CIS countries are less likely to have families or children and generally own fewer material assets in Russia—an average of €57,000 compared to €110,000 in Serbia— mostly consisting of their residential property left behind in Russia. They are clearly focused on finding any kind of work in their host country. Most do not view their current country of residence as a long-term place to live; rather, they hope either to return to Russia “once things settle down” (48%) or to move on to more developed countries.
The instability of relocation within the CIS countries is largely due to the insufficient adaptive potential of the host side—in terms of both material and social infrastructure, as well as relations with the administration. As a result, immigrants experience widespread disappointment with the new living conditions.
Unless Russia faces a new forced mobilization drive, the number of relocators in CIS countries will gradually decline. Some will return to Russia, others will move to more promising countries of residence, and only a small portion will settle in CIS countries.
Respondents in our study overall, as of 2025, estimate the share of returned individuals among their acquaintances who emigrated at 22%. A slightly larger number, 31% of acquaintances who emigrated, believe they have relocated from the CIS and Serbia to developed countries during this period. This leads us to consider the set of countries covered by this study as “transit countries” or a “transit zone”.